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General Introduction and Overview 
Core issues at the heart of development economics as well as agricultural economics are 
addressed in this dissertation. For the past decade, there has been a rapid transformation in the 
global agricultural value chain (see Barrett et al., 2012; Reardon et al., 2004; Barrett et al., 
2001). The rise in supermarkets, the introduction and rise in certification standards, increased 
demand for niche produce, etc. are some of the evidence of the rapid changes taking place in 
the agricultural value chain. These transformations inter alia, have been spearheaded by 
factors such as economic growth, international market integration, urbanization, and changing 
consumer behavior (Mergenthaler et al., 2009).  Bolwig et al. (2009) observed that increases 
in demand and production of niche market products such as organic coffee and organic cocoa 
have led to increases in smallholder farmers’ incomes in most developing countries. However, 
aside the benefits, these value chain transformations have also led to new challenges for 
developing countries agricultural institutions and organizations (see Reardon et al., 2004).  
 
One of such new challenge is how best to overcome certification barriers or maintain group 
certification systems. As a requirement for integrating into high-value niche markets (organic 
and fair-trade markets), smallholder farmers who produce very few acreages of land have to 
be certified. Faced with the high transaction cost associated with the certification process, 
especially with external monitoring, smallholder farmers have to form farmer groups or 
cooperatives. In this regard, Internal Control Systems (ICS) were introduced in farmer groups 
in many developing countries to help overcome the high external monitoring cost (Preißel and 
Reckling, 2010). IFOAM defines ICS as a documented quality assurance system that allows 
the external certification body to delegates the annual inspection of individual group members 
to an identified unit within the certified group (see IFOAM 2003). The certified farmer group 
or cooperative in turn selects internal monitors from either the farmer group or from the 
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village with the responsibility of inspection, monitoring, sanctioning and making 
recommendations to farmers congruent with the standards. For group certification, once the 
certificate is obtained by the group there is high tendency for non-compliance or free-riding, 
which over time could lead to the withdrawal of the group certificate. Thus, the key here for a 
successful farmer group and to link smallholder farmers to high value chains is the 
sustainability of strong internal mechanisms in groups to crowd-out anti-social behaviors.  
 
This dissertation takes a much broader approach with much broader implications not just for 
the certification process, but also for the general provision of public goods in developing 
countries. Like certification, a similar challenge pertains to anti-social behavior such as free-
riding, and the collapse of a number of public goods (community infrastructures) in Sub-
Saharan Africa. For example, the provision and maintenance of borehole water in 
communities, repair and/or maintenance of school buildings and health facilities, maintenance 
of feeder roads in communities, community cleaning to avoid malaria etc., are some examples 
of under supplied development-linked public goods (see Björkman and Svensson, 2009). 
UNIDO report (2008) suggests that mechanisms for the effective delivery of public goods and 
services should be central in any poverty eradication strategy (see also Besley and Ghatak, 
2006).  Thus, this dissertation contributes to two important issues in development economics.  
 
The dissertation uniquely combines both empirical and experimental methods (which are 
much difficult to implement in the field) in the field. Chapter 1 examines corruption (anti-
social behavior) across Sub-Saharan Africa. In this chapter, we consider the micro-economic 
determinants of corruption and provide implications for institutions.  The 2004 World 
Development Report is devoted to putting poor people at the center of monitoring of 
development-oriented programs in developing countries and also aimed at amplifying the 
poor’s voice in policymaking (Olken, 2007; World Bank 2004). Chapters 2 and 3 contribute 
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to this question examining the impact of social characteristics of the monitor and the type of 
sanctioning institution on the provision and maintenance of public goods in developing 
countries.  Specifically, Chapter 2 applies a field experiment and focuses on gender and group 
norm enforcement in matrilineal and patriarchal societies. Chapter 3 uses a similar 
experimental design to examine whether the monitor’s age has an impact on the level of 
compliance to public goods provision. The drivers of corruption and the determinants of the 
effectiveness of monitoring are important questions for development and development 
programs. This dissertation aims at providing evidence on issues that have been under-studied 
in the literature and hopes to bring new evidence to bear on the literature. Below are 
highlights of the three chapters and their main results.  
 
 
Chapter 1: The first chapter concerns the question of whether or not situational factors alter 
individual’s anti-social behavior. This chapter builds on works by Swamy et al. (2001) and 
Dollar et al. (1998) who finds that corruption is less severe in groups or institutions where 
women held a large share of senior positions. Swamy et al. (2001) also finds that women are 
less likely to indulge in corrupt practices than men. Yet, there seem to be little evidence 
however on how anti-social behaviors of individuals, in this case corruption, are altered by 
basic human needs such as the need for food, water services, sanitation services etc.  Another 
important issue that this chapter addresses in detail is whether the observed gender and 
educational differences in pro-social behavior are mainly due to differences in exposure to the 
possibility to be corrupt. Thus, this chapter in part examines the robustness of the earlier 
findings. Using a number of robustness checks including Heckman’s two-stage models, the 
essay examines whether the gender and educational differences in engagement in corruption 
still holds after correcting for the differences in exposure. The empirical evidence shows that 
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not only are women less involved in anti-social behavior; but in addition the gender effects 
hold even when basic needs such as water and sanitation services are at stake. However, basic 
human needs do narrow the magnitude of the gender and educational differences in 
corruption. The chapter concludes that even though the findings further underscore the role of 
women in helping to reduce anti-social behavior, there is the need for stronger institutions as 
individuals’ pro-social motivations may be malleable. This chapter can be viewed as a 
methodological or empirical addition to the literature on anti-social behavior. Chapters 2 and 




Chapters 2 and 3: In these two essays we examine the impact of different institutions on pro-
social behavior or compliance. There are two strands of literature on institutions that foster 
pro-social behavior: one that focuses on monitoring as a mechanism and the other that 
combines monitoring and sanctioning institutions. For example, Björtkman and Svensson 
(2009) find a positive effect of community-based monitoring of projects on the quality and 
quantity of primary health care provision in Uganda. Olken (2007) finds that increasing 
community participation in the monitoring of corruption in Indonesia had little average effect. 
Based on weekly visits to health facilities in India, Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo (2004) find 
no significant impact of monitoring on the attendance of community nurses.  On the impact of 
sanctioning institutions (monetary and non-monetary), a number of experimental papers have 
found large empirical evidence of its effect (see Andreoni and Gee, 2012; Baldassarri and 
Grossman, 2011; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Kube and Traxler, 2011; Yamagishi, 1986).  
Nonetheless, one topic that has received little attention in the growing literature is how the 
characteristics of the monitor affect the outcome of monitoring and the effectiveness of 
sanctions.  In retrospect, little is known whether the small effect of monitoring on outcomes 
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observed in the field are due to certain characteristics of the monitors or whether certain 
characteristics of monitors make them more effective. Thus, should we simply implement 
monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms to achieve cooperation or should we also care about 
who monitors or sanctions in the field?  
 
Chapter 2 applies a unique field experiment in Ghana to examine whether the gender of 
monitors impacts monitoring outcomes. Thus, in effect we examine the role of gender in 
development. In Chapter 3, we proceed to examine the impact of other social characteristics 
of monitors.  Existing research has shown that gender gap permeates many aspects of our 
society. Such evidence seems to be more pronounce in developing countries. For example, 
Agarwal’s (2000) study on community environmental programs observed that women 
participation on management committees is typically low in most developing countries. Matsa 
and Miller (2011) noted that only few women occupy top positions or are selected into 
leadership positions. A number of researchers have attributed these differences to differences 
in risk aversion and competiveness (see Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 
2009; Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Gneezy et al., 2009). In this 
chapter, we examine whether when women are placed in positions of authority or in-charge of 
monitoring development programs they are systematically different in their ability to use 
enforcement institutions. We also examine whether when women use enforcement 
institutions, people respond more or less compared to men. Lastly, we examine in this chapter 
whether the cultural environment in which women live impacts such outcomes. In a sense, 
this chapter tries to trace the origin of such gender differences, if any, by examining historical 
differences in access to resources in matrilineal and patriarchal societies in Ghana. The 
analysis shows that women monitors in the patriarchal communities are less effective using 
enforcement institutions whilst in the matrilineal communities are as effective as the men. The 
data also shows that women and men in the patriarchal communities show similar sanctioning 
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behaviors. The chapter concludes that, the lower effectiveness of women in monitoring or 
fostering collective action is driven by factors that are external to the woman, like the culture 
or general social perception. The evidence squares well with the notion that social cultures 
against women maybe more responsible for low representation of women in positions of 
authority. 
 
The chapter provides strong implication not just for monitoring development public goods but 
also for general public policy. Overall, the chapter argues strongly in favor of “breaking the 
glass ceiling”. However, it argues that policy makers should bear in mind that the placing of 
women in positions of authority alone i.e. “chipping-away at the glass ceiling” would not in 
itself automatically lead to superior outcomes but more policy and institutional commitment 
would be needed in support. The results from this essay together with other papers that 
compare behavior in matrilineal and patriarchal societies point to a robust relationship 
between gender, culture, and economic outcomes. The results are also a testament to the 
presence of strong gender-inequality-differential within countries. This chapter argues that 
policies that promote the welfare of women (i.e. such as economic participation and decision-
making power) especially in developing countries should take into account inequality 
differences within the countries for effective policy intervention. This chapter adds to the 
growing literature on monitoring outcomes of development programs and also contributes to 
the literature on the need for gender empowerment in the development agenda.  
 
In Chapter 3, we probe further the findings in Chapter 2 by examining the role of other social 
dimensions of monitors.  In a number of societies, people mandate respect towards the old. 
We examine whether the provision and monitoring of public goods in developing countries 
are impacted by the age-status of individuals placed in-charge of monitoring. Using a similar 
field experiment as in chapter 2, this chapter examines the impact of the monitor’s age-status 
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on monitoring outcomes. We find that, the elderly are more effective as monitors compared to 
the young. We also find that in smaller communities, the effect is much stronger. The result 
demonstrates the importance of social consideration in monitoring. The essay concludes that, 
in inducing cooperation in the field and sustaining public goods, policy makers must 
understand the social norm that permeates the society in question.  This chapter makes a 
critical contribution to the literature on monitoring of development-based public goods.  
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1 Revisiting the role of Gender, Education and Situational Effects in 







Abstract: This paper uses unique micro-data information on bribe payments in Africa to re-
examine the socioeconomic determinants of corruption. Using a representative sample of over 
24,000 adults across countries in Africa, we show that not only are women  less involved in 
paying bribes; but that this holds even when basic needs such as water and sanitation services 
are at stake. We find that this difference is robust once we control for differences in ‘bribe-
exposure’. The evidence however shows that basic human needs do narrow the magnitude of 
the gender differences in corruption. The evidence for education shows that controlling for 
differences in bribe-exposure completely offsets the educational differences in corruption. 
These findings further underscore the role of women in helping to reduce corruption and the 
need for stronger institutions as individuals’ pro-social motivations may be malleable.  
 
JEL classification: H10; K42; J16  
Keywords: Africa, Corruption, Behavior, Situational Effects, Gender, public policy 
 
 





1.1 Introduction  
It is well-known that corruption is widespread in most developing countries, particularly in 
Africa. This is true in terms of petty corruption but also institutional-level corruption.  Using 
data from the World Bank, Clarke (2011) observed that firms and households paid bribes 
between $0.6 trillion and $1.5 trillion each year between 1999 and 2003. Data from the 
United Nations (2012) indicates that over 30 percent of all development aid is lost annually 
through corrupt practices. In a recent news item on Africa, it is reported that the education of 
some hundreds of children in Nigeria were hampered when a former state governor stole 
some $250 million in public funds (Ravelo, 2012).  Moreover, recent studies have shown that 
corruption poses a critical impediment to economic growth and development across the world 
(Meon and Sekkat, 2005; Powell et al., 2010; Brunetti et al., 1998; Bardham, 1997; Mauro, 
1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; De Sota, 1989; Klitgaard, 1988).1  
Until recently, most of the empirical research on corruption has focused on the macro-
drivers of corruption (see Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Graeff and Mehlkop, 2003; Brunetti and 
Weber, 2003).  For example, Fisman and Gatti (2002) have explored the impact of 
decentralization on country level corruption. Brunetti and Weder (2003) observed at the 
country level, the impact of free-press on corruption. The difficulty of collecting good 
empirical data on is often cited for this state of the literature on corruption (Bardhan, 1997).  
However, recently new micro-data information has been made available that allows for a 
more in-depth analysis.  This paper uses the Afro-barometer data on Sub-Saharan Africa to 
examine the socioeconomic drivers of corruption and provide implications for gender 
empowerment as well as for institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. The existing empirical 
                                                            
1 The negative impact of corruption on growth, investments, informal economy activities, resource allocation 
etc. have been widely discussed by Gupta et al (2001) provides evidence that high and rising corruption 




evidence suggests that females are less likely to be corrupt than men. To the extent that 
females account for only about 6% of corporate CEOs and top executives (Matsa and Miller, 
2011), arguably it is important to understand the extent to which female empowerment could 
have positive spillovers particularly on corruption. Are these gender effects specific to certain 
types of corruption activities? Does basic human needs alter the observed gender differences 
in corruption behavior?  We consider particularly the gender and educational differences in 
bribe-giving and examine whether basic human needs such as the need for water, sanitation, 
etc., alters such behaviors towards corruption. Moreover, the literature suggests that women 
are less likely to be employed or less likely to interact with government officials. In our 
analysis we also employ different approaches to address this potential selectivity problem.  
This paper can be viewed as a methodological and empirical addition to the literature on 
corruption and anti-social behavior. 
We first observe that, ceteris paribus women are less likely to indulge in corrupt 
activities. We find that the need for basic needs such as water and sanitation services do not 
offset the gender gap in corruption behavior. This evidence is robust even when we control 
for differences in ‘bribe-exposure’ using different techniques including a Heckman 2-stage 
procedure, other personal characteristics and country fixed effects. We find that basic human 
needs however do narrow the magnitude of the gender differences in corruption. Country 
specific regressions further shows that in a number of countries (60 percent), women are not 
dissimilar from men when services that benefit the household such as water and sanitation are 
at stake.  In fact in some countries, the sign on the female dummy is positive and in a few 
significant when basic needs are at stake.  The result suggests that, in relative terms, women 
are more willing or likely to give a gift or do a favor (pay bribes) that benefits the household.  
In examining education, we find that explicitly controlling for differences in bribe exposure 
completely bridges the educational differences in corruption observed in previous studies in 
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which higher educated people tend to be more corrupt.  Our finding further underscores the 
role of women in the fight against corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa, and also the need for 
stronger institutions as individuals’ pro-social motivations may be malleable.  
A relatively large body of literature focuses on the effect of corruption on growth and 
development and on the macro-drivers of corruption.  Corruption is argued to increase the 
cost of doing business, and as such discourages entrepreneurship activities that cause growth 
(Powell et al., 2010). Similarly, Méon and Sekkat (2005) observe that as the quality of 
institutions or governance worsens, corruption becomes more detrimental to growth. 
Corruption is also argued to result in the diversion of public investments from more efficient 
sectors to unproductive sectors, and thus affecting growth (Mauro, 1998).  Mauro (1998) finds 
specifically that, corruption adversely affects educational spending.  Rivera-Batiz (2002) finds 
that reducing corruption stimulates technological change and spurs economic growth. Sub-
Saharan Africa’s under-development to a large extent has been attributed to the high 
incidences of corruption. As an example, in examining how corruption affects economic 
activities, Beekman et al. (2013) observed households in rural Liberia by directly monitoring 
the diversion of inputs associated with a development project, and finds that corrupt 
community leaders cause reduced levels of income generating activities i.e., corruption lead to 
a 50% reduction in rice planted.  Ghura (1998) finds that variation in tax revenue-GDP ratios 
across Sub-Saharan African countries are influence significantly by the level of corruption. In 
addition, Gyimah-Brempong (2002) finds that as corruption increases in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
income inequality also increases considerably. In relation to all these evidence, Gatti et al. 
(2003) argues that a more in-depth analysis of the micro-drivers of corruption can provide us 
a more detail guidance for the targeting of anti-corruption policies in such countries.  
Relatively fewer papers consider the micro drivers of corruption.  Using data from 
Georgia (formerly part of the Soviet Union),  Swamy et al. (2001) shows that officials in 
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firms owned or managed by men in Georgia are significantly more likely to be involved in 
bribe-giving than firms managed by women. Dollar et al. (1998) shows corruption to be less 
severe in countries where women held a large share of parliamentary seats and senior 
positions.  
The few studies that explore the micro-drivers of corruption at the individual agent 
level mostly relied on hypothetical questions. For example both micro-data studies by Gatti et 
al. (2003) and Swamy et al. (2001) on individual level behavior towards corruption have 
respondents answer the question on how justified someone accepting a bribe is in the course 
of their duty. They find significantly fewer women justifying the acceptance of bribes 
compare with men. Mocan (2008) in examining bribery behavior across 49 countries across 
the world find women, the rich and the educated more likely to be involved in corrupt 
practices.  The aggregate nature of cross-country studies tells us little about the relationship 
between corruption behavior and individual agents, while the hypothetical measures employed 
at the individual level may also suffers from perception biases and plausible elements of 
‘cheap-talk’ (see also Svensson, 2003)2.  
Despite the growing literature and renewed interest in corruption at the micro-data 
level and its implications, there still remain open questions. Consistent with evidence from 
Alesina et al. (2013) who observed that in some societies, the dominant belief is that women 
should not be allowed to participate freely, and equally to males in activities outside the 
home, we examine the notion that the increase participation of women (empowerment) and 
the less privileged (such as the less educated) aside empowerment brings additional benefits 
to decreasing corruption. Specifically, we consider whether gender differences in corruption 
are robust to different types of opportunities for corruption. We ask: are the gender 
                                                            
2 Closely related to our study is that of Mocan (2008) who examined the probability of being asked for a bribe 
across 49 countries, majority of which are not in sub-Saharan African countries. 
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differences in corruption persistent once basic needs are at stake? To the best of our 
knowledge, there is limited research on how situational effects alter these relations i.e., for 
example situations such as the dire need for water access, sanitation services, health services 
etc. Differences in bribe exposure have also been argued to explain differences in corruption 
behavior (see Mocan, 2008). We examines whether controlling for such differences in ‘bribe-
exposure’ completely bridges the gender and educational gaps in corruption.  
We also focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Despite corruption being a more serious 
problem in Sub-Saharan Africa, most of the micro- studies on corruption experiences includes 
a very small sample of African countries3. We therefore argue that the issue of corruption in 
Sub-Saharan Africa seems to be incompletely dealt with in the literature.  In this vein, our 
paper contributes both to the broader literature on corruption, as well as helps to bridge the 
gap in research on corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. Key to our analysis is the large micro 
data available on Sub-Saharan African countries where gender empowerment challenges and 
inequality are more pronounced. Specifically, we employ the Afrobarometer survey data that 
covers 20 countries and involves over 24,000 individuals across Sub-Saharan Africa to 
explore the additional benefit resulting from gender empowerment. In addition to other 
estimation methods, we employ the Heckman two–stage procedure to correct for possible 
selectivity bias associated with differences in corruption exposure.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a review of the 
determinants of corruption. Section 1.3 presents a description of the data. In section 1.4 we 
present the empirical results. Finally, section 1.5 concludes.    
 
                                                            
3 Mocan (2008) included four African countries (Uganda, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana), Swamy et al. 
(2001) included two African countries (South Africa and Nigeria), Gatti et al., (2003) included one African 
country (Nigeria). The number of African countries thus has risen from one in 2003 to four in 2008, signifying 
an ever increasing importance of Africa, but also indicates the void in research and the need to further investigate 




1.2 Relevant Literature  
Several studies have highlighted the factors that influence corruption both at the individual 
level, as well as at the aggregate country-level. Different theories associate corruption with 
the level of economic development, cultural traditions, political institutions, government 
policies, and socioeconomic factors (Treisman, 2000). Specifically, legal, political 
competitions, press freedom, decentralization, gender, education, religion inter alia are often 
found to influence corruption behaviors (see Lessmann and Markwardt, 2009; Treisman, 
2000; Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Freille et al. (2007) noted that 
there remains within the literature little systematic research on the robustness analysis of the 
drivers of corruption. 
In this paper our focus is on the socioeconomic dimensions of corruption. The theoretical 
argument made for the link between gender and corruption is in two-folds: (1) women have 
lower preference for criminal activities than men, (2) women are less likely to be involved in 
corrupt practices not because they have lower preference for it but because they are less 
exposed, i.e. less likely to be employed, less likely to interact with government officials.  The 
data so far have not allowed for a detailed examination of whether the systematic differences 
between women and men in terms of bribe exposure accounts for the differences in their 
behavior towards corruption. Among other things, we hope to contribute to this debate. There 
is also some indicative or reduced-form evidence to suggest that human needs could alter 
individuals’ pro-social behavior (see Ward and Stewart, 2003; Becker, 1993; Zedner, 1991). 
This informs our hypothesis that women and men may not necessarily be dissimilar in their 




In terms of the correlation between education and corruption in Africa, a variety of 
arguments has been put forward with varying implications.  The first of such theoretical 
argument is the exposure to bribery argument. Mocan (2008) argues that the highly educated 
may have more opportunity to interact with government official and therefore are more likely 
to be corrupt. A number of empirical studies provide support for the positive relationship 
between education and corruption (see Swamy et al., 2001; Mocan, 2008; Kaffenberger, 
2012). These studies do not control for differences in exposure to public officials.4 However, 
others argue in the opposite direction and consider that more educated citizens may be better 
placed to pay more attention to corrupt activities and may be better able to take action against 
corrupt officials (Glaeser and Saks, 2006, Treisman, 2000). Glaeser and Saks (2006) provide 
empirical proof in support of this argumentation to show that more educated states in the U.S. 
have less corruption.5   
At the country level, Treisman (2000) and Chowdhury (2004) observed the impact of 
democracy on corruption.  They find that the effect of democracy on corruption even though 
small in the case of Treisman (2000), was robust to the inclusion of controls for economic 
development and openness to trade. In this paper and consistent with the evidence by 
Treisman (2000) and Chowdhury (2004), we further examine the role of democracy at the 
individual level i.e., the effect of individual’s preference for democracy on corruption 
behavior. In addition to democracy and in line with the debate on political connections and 
economic outcomes, we ask whether the politically affiliated in sub-Saharan Africa are more 
corrupt. Using a survey on China, Li et al. (2008) finds political connections help private 
                                                            
4 In studying individuals’ corruption perceptions of government institutions and not necessarily corruption 
experiences, Attila (2011) finds the higher educated having a higher perception of corruption. This result was 
based on the Afrobarometer data for 12 countries. Kaffenberger (2012) also observe a positive effect of 
education using the Afrobarometer data. They however did not control for differences in exposure or selectivity 
bias. 
5 Truex (2011) find similar results for Nepal to the effect that more educated respondents’ show less acceptance 
attitudes towards corrupt behaviors. They however recognize further research is needed to test the strength of 




entrepreneurs to obtain loans from banks or other state institutions, and afford them more 
confidence in the legal system. With our unique date on sub-Saharan Africa, we are able to go 
a step further to assess whether political connections corrupt institutions. Corruption 
behaviors are most often cited to depend on gender, age, employment status, economic 
situation, educational attainment and the location of residence (see Mocan, 2008: Gatti et al., 
2003; Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001).  Using these covariates we examined pro-
social behavior towards corruption in the midst of situational factors.  
 
1.3 Data Description and Descriptive Statistics 
The Afrobarometer Data 
The data used in the analysis is from the 2008 Afrobarometer survey for Africa. The data 
involves a national representative sample of adult respondents across 20 African countries. 
The list of countries in the sample and used in our analysis are Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In total, 
27,713 individuals were interviewed for their involvement in three different categories of 
bribes, together with a host of other questions related to democratic preferences. For the 
purpose of our current econometric analysis we are able to use a total of 24,296 of the 
respondents.   
Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. 
Measuring corruption is obviously a tricky one because of its illegality (Brunetti and Weder, 
2003). The Afrobarometer survey asked the question: ‘In the past year, how often (if ever) 
have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor to government officials in order to: (A) 
Get a document or a permit? (B) Get water or sanitation services? (C) Avoid a problem with 
10 
 
the police?’ Even though we agree that people may under state their involvement in 
corruption due to its illegality, we argue this may hold true especially for western countries 
where institution and sanctions for norm violation is strongly enforced. The possible 
responses for the self-involvement in corruption variable are: (1) No experience with this in 
the past year; (2) Never; (3) Once or twice; (4) A few times; (5) Often; (6) Don’t know. Due 
to the ambiguity of the last option ‘don’t know’, the option is dropped in our analysis. This is 
because it is not clear whether the respondent doesn’t know the number of times or doesn’t 
know of any experience. The proportion of respondents who answered ‘don’t know’ are 
however quite small in all three cases (<1%). The initial corruption response categories in the 
Afrobarometer survey are also rescaled for simplicity to take on the values 1 (bribe-giving) if 
the respondent has positive experience of bribe payment, and 0 otherwise.  
From Table 1.1 presents the descriptive statistics.  The female and male interviewees 
in the data are 49.69% and 50.31%, respectively. Based on the re-scale of the corruption 
measures, we show the mean corruption significant higher for males compared to females (p-
value < 0.000; across all the corruption types). The average age of the population is 
approximately 36 years. The educational variable in the Afrobarometer survey takes on 
numerical values assigned to each level of education, ranging from 0 “no formal education” to 
9 “post-graduate education”. Specifically, 19% have no formal education, 18% have some 
primary education, 15% have completed primary school, 22% have some secondary 
education, 15% have completed secondary school, and 11% have post-secondary education. 
The population is distributed across both urban and rural areas: 38% reside in urban areas and 
62% reside in rural areas. Religion appears important to majority of the interviewees. 
Responding to the question on religion “How important is religion in your life?”: 3% 
answered “not at all important”; 3% answered “not very much important”; 10% answered 
“somewhat important”; and 84% responded “very important”. We also include two political 
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economy variables: individual’s support for democracy and political affiliation. Seventy one 
percent of the respondents have a preference for democracy over any form of national 
governance while 60% of the respondents have a political affiliation. In addition to the 
demographic characteristics, we also focus on controlling for differences in the exposure to 
bribery. Seventy percent of the population have made payments for fees for a government 
service such as education or health care, 26% have made payments for license fees to local 
government, e.g., for a bicycle, cart, or market stall, 25% have made payments for property 











Panel A: Descriptive on corruption activities    
Get a document or a permit 
No experience 
Never 
Once or twice 


























Get water or sanitation service (Household needs) 
No experience 
Never 
Once or twice 


























Avoid a problem with the police 
No experience 
Never 
Once or twice 


























Panel B:  Descriptive on other characteristicsa#    
Female (Dummy for female respondent) 0.496     
(0.499) 
  
Age (Years) 36.274   
(14.404) 
37.720      
(15.102) 
34.803   
(13.499) 
Education (0-9) 3.214    
(1.996) 
3.436      
(2.004) 




1.574     
(1.615) 
1.796       
(1.675) 
1.349     
 (1.518) 
Household head (dummy) 0.492    
(0.553) 
0.649     
(0.519) 
0.333     
(0.542) 
Rural (Dummy) 0.619    
(0.486) 
0.620)    
 (0.485) 
0.618     
(0.486) 
Religion (Importance of religion, 0-4) 
 
3.749    
(0.657) 
3.707     
(0.715) 
3.792      
(0.590) 
Economic Situation (compared to others, 0-5) 
 




2.773     
(1.010) 
Support for democracy (Dummy equals to one for preference for 
democracy, zero otherwise) 
0.708    
(0.455) 
0.745       
(0.436) 
0.671     
(0.470) 
Political Affiliation (Dummy for having a political affiliation, zero 
otherwise) 
0.596    
(0.491) 
0.632      
 (0.482) 
0.559     
(0.497) 
Bribe exposure variables 
Payment of fees for a government service such as education or health 
care (dummy) 
Payment of license fees to local government, e.g., for a bicycle, cart, 
or market stall (dummy) 
 
0.701     
(0.458) 
0.261     
(0.439) 
 
0.713      
(0.452) 
0.301      
 (0.459) 
 
0.689    
 (0.463) 
0.220     
(0.414) 
Payments of property rates or taxes (dummy) 
 
Payment of public utility fees, e.g., for water, electricity or telephone 
(dummy) 
0.251    
(0.433) 
0.471    
(0.499) 
0.286      
(0.452) 
0.485      
(0.500) 
0.215    
(0.411) 
0.457     
(0.498) 
N 24,294 12,249 12047 
Notes: # Mean values with standard deviations in parentheses are shown. a Female denotes whether respondent is female or male;  age denotes 
chronological age in years; Education denotes whether the respondent has No formal schooling, Informal schooling only, Some primary 
schooling, Primary school completed, Some secondary school / high school, completed secondary school, Post-secondary qualifications 
(other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college), Some university, Completed university or Post-graduate; 
employment  denotes whether the individual has no job (not looking), no job (looking), part-time (not looking), part-time (looking), full-time 
job (not looking) or full-time job (looking),  religion denotes whether religion not at all important, not very important, somewhat important, 
or very important;  economic situation  denotes whether compared to others the individual is much worse, worse, same better or much better.   
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1.4 Empirical Results 
1.4.1 Severity of different types of corruption across sub-Saharan Africa 
As a first step, we begin our analysis by first presenting information on the severity 
(proportion of individuals who reported paying bribes or giving gifts) of the three types of 
bribes in each country in the sample. This is important for individual country policy-targeting. 
We also rank the countries from most corrupt to least corrupt based on each of the three bribe 
categories. Specifically, column 1 of Table 1.2 presents the severity of bribery in getting a 
document or permit in each of the sampled countries.  Column 2 presents corruption levels in 
getting basic human needs such as water and sanitation. Column 3 presents the severity of 
bribery in the police service across the sampled countries. And column 4 presents the country 
average corruption level; which is a weighted mean of all three types of bribery for all 
individuals in the country.  
Results from Table 1.2 show dissimilarity in the severity of the different types of 
corruption across the countries. For example, in Senegal whilst getting a document or 
government permit is a big problem without paying a bribe, the problem is not that severe for 
basic needs and bribes to the police. In Cape Verde however, it is more difficult getting basic 
necessitates like water or sanitation without paying a bribe than dealing with police without 
paying bribes. In Uganda, the payments of bribes for basic needs are as high as the payment 
of bribes for government documents or permits as well as bribes to the police. For policy 
intervention, the data shows that Uganda must target with equal measure all these 3 
dimensions of corruption. The data shows that, the biggest challenge for Nigeria for example 
is to reduce corruption in the police service. 
Overall, whilst Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique recoded the highest bribe payments 
for government’s documents or permits; Uganda, Nigeria and Mozambique recorded the 
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highest bribery for basic needs like water and sanitation. The data shows that bribery to the 
police is more predominant in Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria in that order. The least corrupt 
country in terms of getting a government document or permit, and in terms of basic 
necessities or in bribery to the police is Botswana. The data also indicates that overall bribery 
in the most corrupt country (Uganda) is more than 16 times that of the least corrupt 
(Botswana) signaling high variability in corruption within Africa. These comparisons 
highlight corruption differences across the different types of bribes for policy and 
developmental targeting.  
 














Average corruption overall 
     
Uganda 0.241 (2) 0.223 (1) 0.242 (2) 0.235 (1) 
Kenya  0.281 (1) 0.115 (5) 0.263 (1) 0.219 (2) 
Nigeria 0.214 (5) 0.154 (2) 0.236 (3) 0.201(3) 
Mozambique 0.229 (3) 0.142 (3) 0.154(6)  0.175 (4) 
Liberia 0.195 (7) 0.126 (4) 0.174 (5) 0.165 (5) 
Zimbabwe 0.228 (4) 0.080 (9) 0.187(4) 0.165 (6) 
Burkina Faso 0.148 (8) 0.081 (7) 0.103 (9) 0.110 (7) 
Ghana 0.115 (12) 0.086 (6) 0.107 (8) 0.103(8) 
Zambia 0.132 (10) 0.050 (14) 0.117 (7) 0.100 (9) 
Mali 0.128 (11) 0.062 (11) 0.094 (10) 0.094 (10) 
Benin 0.143 (9) 0.065 (10) 0.057 (13) 0.088(11) 
Senegal 0.196 (6) 0.039 (15) 0.032 (19) 0.089(12) 
Tanzania 0.086 (16) 0.037 (16) 0.094 (10) 0.072 (13) 
Cape Verde 0.093 (14) 0.081 (7) 0.035 (17) 0.070(14) 
South Africa 0.072 (17) 0.059 (13) 0.065 (12) 0.065(15) 
Lesotho 0.102 (13) 0.027 (18) 0.047 (15) 0.059(16) 
Namibia 0.067 (19) 0.062 (11) 0.040 (16) 0.056(17) 
Malawi 0.067 (18) 0.033 (17) 0.050 (14) 0.050(18) 
Madagascar 0.086(15) 0.003 (20) 0.034 (18) 0.041(19) 
Botswana 0.014 (20) 0.005(19) 0.025(20) 0.014(20) 
a Means are decreasing in severity from highest corruption (1) to lowest corruption (20). The 
corruption indices take on values between 0 and 1 with 0= least corrupt  
 









1.4.2 Regression results 
The empirical section of this paper is divided in three parts.  The first part examines the 
relationships between    socioeconomic characteristics and corruption without including 
controls for bribe exposure. This we carry out for the basic human needs model as well as the 
other types of corruptions. In the second part, we examine the relationships between 
socioeconomic characteristics and corruption, just as before, but in this case including 
variables to controls for differences in bribe exposure. In the third part, the paper models 
corruption behavior as a two-step process to take into account the self-selection into exposure 
to government officials and bribe payments. Heckman procedure is adopted in this section to 
correct for selection bias (see Heckman, 1979). 
We now proceed to present evidence of the relationship between socioeconomic 
characteristics and corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. Our main interest here is on the 
coefficients of the gender dummy and the education variable. As a first step, we regress:  
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐶𝑖 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝐶 𝑐𝐶𝑐𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 +  𝛿𝑖𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖                   (1) 
 
Where 𝑖 denotes individual respondent, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 indicates gender of respondent, 𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐶 
denotes the educational level of the respondent. The controls are the usual controls in the 
literature on the micro-level determinants of corrupt behavior (see Gatti et al., 2003; Swamy 
et al., 2001).  The control variables are age, employment, religiosity, an indicator variable that 
equals one if the respondent lives in a rural location, preference for democracy, political 
affiliation and a variable that captures economic situation of the individual. Finally, we also 
include 20 country fixed effects, δ. The regressions are weighted and stratified on the female-
male level.  
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Table 1.3 reports marginal effects from Probit estimation on data from the 24,296 
respondents. In the first column, we estimated equation (1) using whether or not the 
respondents paid bribes (0= no bribe-payment, 1= paid bribes) to get a document or permit as 
the dependent variable. The coefficient of the female dummy variable is observed to be 
negative and significant at all conventional levels of significance. Specifically, the marginal 
effect for the female dummy variable is -4.5 percent; indicating that a woman’s likelihood of 
paying bribes for a government document or permit is 4.5 % points less than that of the 
likelihood for  a man. In the second column, we estimate the same equation (1) but this time 
using whether or not the respondents paid bribes (0= no bribe-payment, 1= paid bribes) to get 
basic necessities such as water and sanitation. The estimated coefficient for the female 
dummy is negative and significant at conventional levels of significance. However, the 
marginal effect here for the female dummy variable as presented reduces to -1.3 percent. This 
is somehow consistent with the hypothesis that human needs could alter individuals’ pro-
social behavior. However the evidence shows that human needs do not completely crowd-out 
women intrinsic motivation to act pro-socially. In the third column, we estimate equation (1) 
using whether or not the respondents paid bribes (0= no bribe-payment, 1= paid bribes) to 
avoid problems with the police. The results are almost similar to the case of paying bribes for 
documents and permits i.e. that a woman’s likelihood of paying bribes to the police is 4.6 % 
points less than that of the likelihood for  a man.  Overall the data shows that females are 
negatively associated with corruption irrespective of the type of corruption even though the 
magnitudes of the gender differences may differ. 
We now turn our attention to the coefficient for the ‘education’ variable. From column (1), we 
observe that the estimated coefficient for education, 𝛽2 , is positive and statistically significant 
at all conventional levels. Results in column (2) and (3) are all similar to that of column (1) 
for the education variable i.e. positive and statistically significant correlation between 
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education and corruption even after controlling for differences in economic situation. The 
magnitudes of the marginal effects however differ across the different categories of 
corruption. The marginal effect is relatively smaller for column 2 (basic human needs model). 
Our empirical result here which shows a positive relationship between education and 
corruption somehow contradicts the hypothesis that more educated citizens may be better able 
to take action against corrupt officials and as such less willing to pay bribes.  Mocan (2008) 
argues that the reason for such contradiction maybe that more educated citizens are more 
exposed to bribery. To this end, we also report estimates for similar empirical models but in 
this case with controls for differences in the exposure to bribes. In addition to differences in 
employability, we control for whether or not in the past year the individual made any of the 
following payments: (1) payments of fees for government services, (2) payment of fees for 
government licenses, (3) payments of property rates and taxes, and (4) payments of public 




Table.1.3 Individual level corruption 

















     




0.009***    
(0.001) 
0.011***    
(0.001) 












-0.001***    
(0.000) 
-0.000**    
(0.000) 




0.007***    
(0.001)  
0.006***    
(0.002)  
Religion     




0.003    
(0.011) 
0.004    
(0.008) 




-0.041***     
(0.007) 
-0.039***     
(0.006) 




0.001   
(0.002) 




















Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observation 24,296 24,296 24,296 24,296 
Prob > F           =  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
b The coefficients are the marginal effects. They are adjusted for clustering at the country level. *** Significant 
at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
In all the specifications in Table 1.4, all the coefficients of the control variables that proxy 
exposure to bribery follows the prior expectations i.e., they are all positive and highly 
significant at all conventional levels. The most striking difference after controlling for 
differences in bribe exposure using the four exposure variables, is that education in the basic 
human needs model in column 2 becomes marginally significant at the 10% level. In terms of 
gender, we do not observe much change. The female dummy remains negative and significant 
at all conventional levels in all specifications after controlling for bribe exposure. Comparing 
the marginal effects for the female dummy variable with and without controlling for bribe 
exposure, we observe that whilst in column (1) of Table 1.2 woman’s likelihood of paying 
                                                            
6 We also run reduced form regressions without controls for support for democracy and political affiliations and 
find qualitatively similar results 
19 
 
bribes for a government document or permit is 4.5 % points less than that of the likelihood for 
a man, we observe that this likelihood drops to 4.0 % after controlling for differences to bribe 
exposure. We also observe that, once we control for bribe exposure in Table 1.4 of column (2) 
woman’s likelihood of paying bribes for   basic needs like water and sanitation which is 1.3 % 
points less than that of the likelihood for a man in Table 1.3, drops to 1.0 %. In column (3), 
the coefficient of the female dummy, similar to column (1) drops to 4.1% from 4.6%.  The 
result suggests that the differences in exposure to bribery do not completely account for 
differences in corrupt behavior across gender and education. Thus, regardless of which 
specification is preferred (either Table 1.1 or 1.2), the empirical results for gender and 




Table .1.4. Individual level corruption (controlling for bribe exposure) 

















     
Education 0.011***   
(0.002) 
0.002*    
(0.001) 
0.006***    
(0.001) 
0.007***    
(0.001) 








Age -0.001***      
(0.000) 
-0.000     
(0.000) 
-0.001***    
(0.000) 
-0.001***    
(0.000) 
Employment 0.003*    
(0.002) 
0.001    
(0.001)  
0.004***    
(0.001)  
0.003*    
(0.001)  
Religion     
Very important 0.005  
(0.014) 
0.000    
(0.008) 
-0.002    
(0.011) 
-0.001    
(0.008) 
Rural -0.017***     
(0.006) 
-0.014***     
(0.004) 
-0.022***     
(0.005) 
-0.020***     
(0.005) 
Economic situation 0.000    
(0.003) 
0.002    
(0.002) 
0.000   
(0.002) 
0.000   
(0.002) 
















     
Bribe exposure     










Payment of fees for 
gov’t License 
0.043***   
(0.005) 
0.018***    
(0.004) 
0.037***    
(0.005) 
0.045***    
(0.007) 
Payments of property 
rates and taxes 
0.044***   
(0.007) 
0.019***   
(0.005) 
0.036***   
(0.004) 
0.048***   
(0.008) 
Payment of public 
utility fees 
0.026***   
(0.006) 
0.035***   
(0.006) 
0.031***   
(0.004) 
0.038***   
(0.007) 
     
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observation 24,296 24,296 24,296 24,296 
Prob > F           =  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
c The coefficients are the marginal effects. They are adjusted for clustering at the country level. We also run 
reduced form regressions without controls for support for democracy and political affiliations and find 
qualitatively similar results*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
1.4.3 Robustness Check 
Alternatively and as a robustness check for our previous results, we formulate the corruption 
outcome as a two-stage process and estimate using the Heckman procedure (see Heckman, 
1979). We assume that indulging in corrupt practices is non-random, and as such an 
individual’s corruption behavior will first depend on the individual’s level of exposure to 
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corruption. We employed the two-stage Heckman procedure to address this possible 
selectivity. The two-stage Heckman approach employed involves the estimation of a 
‘corruption-exposure’ selection model (i.e. which captures the probability of exposure) at the 
first stage and then a corruption equation at the second stage. Since both the first and second 
stages are probability models, we estimate a special application of the Heckman model 
(heckprob).  To implement the procedure we construct an individual level index for the level 
of exposure to government official based on our four exposure variables i.e. payment of fees 
for government services, payment of fees for government license, payments of property rates 
and taxes, and payment of public utility fees. Since each exposure variable is a dummy, our 
index ranges from 0 for no exposure to 4, exposures to all four variables. The dummy for the 
level of exposure takes on the value 1 if the index is greater than 0.5 and 0, otherwise.7    
The first-stage selection model can be specified as: 
𝑃(𝐺𝑖 > 0)  = 𝐹(𝛾𝑍𝑖 +  𝐶𝑖)     (2) 
where 𝐺𝑖 is a dummy variable denoting the level of interactions with government 
officials: 𝐺𝑖 = 1 if an individual has a higher level of interaction (>0.5) and 𝐺𝑖 = 0, 
otherwise.  𝑍 is a vector of regressors, 𝛾 is a vector of parameters, 𝐶 is the error term. 𝐹(∙) 
refers to the cumulative distribution function. Equation (2) can be considered as the 
unobserved exposure (selection) process. Variables captured in the exposure model include 
age, education, gender, support for democracy, political affiliation, urban area and household 
head (exclusion restriction).  The definition and summary statistics of the individual 
characteristics used in the model are the same as define in Table 1.1. 
The bribe equation at the second-stage can be specified as:  
                                                            
7 The results are found to be qualitatively similar when we change the degree of exposure from greater than 0.5 
to  greater or equal to 0.5. We find that at weaker thresholds i.e. exposure to any at all (threshold greater that 
zero) education is significant in some models. See appendix for these results.  
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𝐶𝑖 =  𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖     (3) 
(𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖) ~ 𝐺(0, 0,𝜎𝑢2,𝜎𝑣2,𝜌𝑢𝑣)      
 
where 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of regressors, 𝛽 is a vector of parameters, 𝑣 is the error term, and  
𝑣 𝑎𝑐𝑎 𝐶 are assumed non-independent. The vector of regressors in the bribery model includes 
variables also specified in the selection model but with the exception of the household head 
variable which is specific to the selection model. We however include religion, economic 
condition and country specific dummies as additional explanatory variables in the bribery 
equation.  
For the empirical estimations, we employ the standard two-step Heckman approach in 
which we estimate the probit exposure (selection) model in the first stage, and then include 
the inverse Mills ratio (the ratio of the probability density function to the cumulative 
distribution function) obtained at the first stage as an additional explanatory variable for the 
second stage regression model to correct for the selectivity. The Heckman procedure yields 
consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates as they account for possible selectivity 
(Heckman, 1979).  
Table 1.5 presents estimated coefficients for the corruption equation from the two-step 
Heckman procedure.  Of particular interest here are the coefficients of the female dummy and 
the educational attainment variable, but we first show results for the role of democracy and 
political affiliation variable on corruption behavior. Interestingly, the estimates from the two-
stage Heckman procedure as presented in Table 5 shows that ‘support for democracy’ and 
‘political affiliations’ are important determinants of corruption behavior in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The dummy variable for ‘support for democracy’ carries a negative in all four models 
and significant at the 10 percent level of significance. However, we find the political 
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affiliation dummy to be positive and significant across all the models. This implies that while 
people who support democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa are less likely to be involved in corrupt 
activities, in contrast, people who have stronger political affiliations are more likely to be 
involved in corruption. Support for democracy in this case could be a reflection of the rule of 
law inherent in the democratic process. In terms of political affiliation, the results provide 
suggestive evidence on how political affiliations in Sub-Saharan Africa undermines 
institutions especially institutions against corruption. 
From columns (1) – (4) of Table 1.5, we find that when we explicitly account for first-
stage selectivity bias, the dummy for the educational variable is now no longer significant in 
all models. This result implies that the educational differences observed in corruption 
behavior in models without controlling for selectivity can be misleading. In terms of gender, 
however, we find that accounting for selection bias does not completely bridge the gender gap 
in corruption. The coefficient of the female dummy remains negative and significant at 
conventional levels. This result holds regardless of the type of corruption. Comparing the 
results of the Hackman models in Table 5 with the standard probit models in Tables 3 and 4, 
we observe sharp differences in the magnitudes of the gender differences. The Heckman 
marginal estimates for the female dummy are much smaller compared with the standard probit 
marginal estimates. For example, the gender gap in corruption for getting a government 
documents or permits reduces from 4.5% points to 3.4 % points after explicitly accounting for 
the first-stage selectivity. Column 2 reports the estimates for the basic needs model. In terms 
of basic human needs such as water and sanitation services, the gender differences reduces 
from a 1.3 % point gap to 0.7% point gap (almost 50% reduction) upon controlling for the 
selectivity. Comparing the marginal effects across the different types of corruption, we find 
that the gender gap is about 2.9 % point lower when basic human needs at stake. The gender 
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gap, however, even though smaller when basic human needs such as water and sanitation 
services are at stake, remains negative and significant at conventional levels.  
Table .1.5 Individual level corruption (Heckman-two-stage Model) 

















     
Education 0.005   
(0.004) 
0.001    
(0.002) 
0.003    
(0.004) 
0.005   
(0.003) 








Age -0.002***      
(0.000) 
-0.001**     
(0.000) 
-0.001***    
(0.000) 
-0.001***    
(0.000) 
Employment 0.006***    
(0.002) 
-0.003**    
(0.001)  
0.007***   
(0.001)  
0.006***    
(0.002)  
Religion     
Very important 0.009  
(0.014) 
 0.004    
(0.009) 
 0.003    
(0.004) 
-0.004    
(0.008) 
Rural  0.002     
(0.015) 
-0.008     
(0.009) 
-0.017     
(0.013) 
-0.018    
(0.013) 
Economic situation 0.002    
(0.003) 
0.003    
(0.002) 




















     








Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observation 24,296 24,296 24,296 24,296 
Prob > F           =  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
f The coefficients are the marginal effects. They are adjusted for clustering at the country level. *** Significant 




We now proceed to check the sensitivity of our results to possible outlier observations. We 
individually and jointly eliminate the two countries with the highest and lowest levels of 
corruption for basic needs8  (see Table 1.6 for results). In doing this, we find the magnitude or 
significance of the coefficient on gender is not affected significantly.  Finally, even though we 
find and confirm an overall robust gender differences in corruption even when basic human 
                                                            
8 Uganda and Nigeria are the highest, whereas lowest is Botswana and Madagascar. See Deininger and Squire 
(1998) for a similar approach. 
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needs are at stake, it does not necessarily imply the same for all the individual countries. One 
way to assess this issue is to run country-specific regression specifications including dummies 
controlling for unobserved regional characteristics. Table 1.7 reports these results.  Doing so, 
we find that for 80% of the countries the sign on the ‘female’ variable is negative for basic 
human needs, signifying that for majority of the countries females are negatively associated 
with corruption even when basic human needs such as water and sanitation services are at 
stake.  We find however the gender gap in corruption when basic human needs are at stake is 
narrowed and disappears in 40 % of these countries. In a few countries, the gender effect is 





1.5 Conclusion  
In recent times, the issue of corruption has become very important especially for developing 
countries. Recent studies have shown that corruption poses a critical impediment to economic 
growth and development. This paper adds to the small but growing literature on the drivers of 
corruption around the world using a unique micro data set on self-reported gift-giving or bribe 
payments in Africa.  Overall, we find a strong and negative association between women and 
corruption in Africa. Specifically, we find that women are less involved in paying bribes and 
that this gender gap in behavior holds across different types of bribes including basic needs. 
We find however that when basic human needs such as water and sanitation services are at 
stake, the magnitude of the gender differences in corruption is much smaller. We find these 
results robust to controlling for various differences in ‘bribe-exposure’ i.e. differences in 
employment and the extent of interactions with government officials, and employing 
techniques to address selectivity. Overall the results are consistent with the views that 
increasing women visibility or economic participation in Africa could help reduce corruption 
on the continent. The results however also suggest that people’s pro-social motivation could 
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be crowded-out by their need for survival, and as result there is the need for stronger 
institutions, structural change or modernization in service delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa to 
help combat corruption.  
Lastly, we have also presented suggestive evidence to show the additional benefit of 
democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. We find evidence that individuals who support democracy 
in Sub-Saharan Africa are less likely to be involved in corruption. Controlling for differences 
in exposure using the Heckman two-stage procedure did not change this result. For the case of 
political affiliations, we find that political affiliation is bad news for corruption reduction in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In all the models estimates, the coefficient of the political affiliation 
variable shows a positive effect of political affiliation on corruption. Overall, these findings 
provide additional support for the need for democratic principles in Sub-Saharan Africa, but 
also caution that gains from democracy could be eroded by strong political affiliations.  
 
 
Table.1.6 Sensitivity results under basic needs 
 Highest Lowest Both 













    
Country dummies Yes yes yes 
Exposure dummies Yes yes yes 
# Observation 20043 22038 17785 
#Countries 18 18 16 
Notes: Column 1 drops two countries with the highest level of corruption for basic needs, Column 2 drops that 
for the lowest two countries and column 3 drops both the highest two and lowest two countries. Table shows 






Table 1.7 Results from estimations of country specific regressions with regional dummies 
 Basic Human Needs Getting a Document or 
Permit 
Police 







Countries with a negative and significant gender difference  in bribery for basic human needs 
Botswana -0.007575    (2.48) -0.008560    (1.51)   -0.017932    (1.92) 
Cape Verde -0.014493    (1.69) -0.003710     (0.28) -0.010114    (1.84) 
Ghana -0.020056    (3.02) -0.048523    (3.16) -0.084713    (6.07) 
Kenya -0.038336     (2.28) -0.139652    (5.84) -0.194897    (8.75) 
Lesotho -0.010366    (1.93) -0.027728    (2.94) -0.026457    (6.57) 
Mali -0.017423      (2.51) -0.089989    (6.29) -0.054149    (3.95) 
Uganda -0.057523    (3.76) -0.097834     (6.81)   -0.094338     (6.62) 
Zambia -0.012205     (2.33) -0.019825    (1.02) -0.030545     (3.68) 
Countries with a negative and but ‘not’ significant gender difference in bribery for basic human needs 
Benin -0.011826    (0.64) -0.042240     (3.13) -0.037250    (2.94) 
Madagascar -0.000274    (0.15)  0.023121     (3.15) -0.004621    (0.91) 
Malawi -0.002113    (0.41)   -0.03828    (4.46) -0.042679    (11.02)  
Mozambique -0.026444    (1.24) -0.110931    (4.13) -0.051457    (2.44) 
Senegal -0.011613    (0.97) -0.060006    (3.25) -0.013093     (1.31) 
Tanzania -0.011529    (1.61) -0.056022    (3.55) -0.090849     (7.20) 
Zimbabwe -0.001898     (0.21) -0.050054    (2.23) -0.059931     (3.03) 
 
Countries with a positive gender difference in bribery for basic human needs*  
Burkina Faso 0.003437    (0.33)  -0.017759     (1.08) -0.037420    (2.95) 
Liberia 0.020103    (1.90) 0.0124158    (0.64)  -0.016681        (0.76)    
Namibia 0.000011    (0.00) -0.023885     (2.59) -0.007927    (0.87)   
Nigeria 0.006025    (0.55) -0.161168    (2.68) -0.059858     (2.93) 
South Africa 0.000870    (0.18) 0.0179561    (3.06)  0.004480    (0.61) 



























1.6 Appendix to Chapter 
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Heckman two-stage Model (varying exposure thresholds)h  
 Exposure  
greater than zero 
 Exposure  































Education 0.006*   
(0.003) 
0.000    
(0.002) 
0.004    
(0.003) 
0.006**    
(0.003) 
 0.003   
(0.005) 
-0.002    
(0.003) 
0.002    
(0.004) 
0.005    
(0.004) 
















Age -0.002***      
(0.000) 
-0.001**     
(0.000) 
-0.001***    
(0.000) 
-0.001***    
(0.000) 
 -0.002***      
(0.000) 
-0.001***     
(0.000) 
-0.001***    
(0.000) 
-0.001***    
(0.000) 
Employment 0.006***    
(0.002) 
0.003**    
(0.001)  
0.007***   
(0.001)  
0.006***   
(0.002)  
 0.006***    
(0.002) 
0.003**    
(0.001)  
0.007***   
(0.001)  
0.006***   
(0.002)  
Religion          
Very important 0.009  
(0.014) 
 0.004    
(0.009) 
 0.003    
(0.011) 
 0.004    
(0.008) 
 0.009  
(0.014) 
 0.003    
(0.009) 
 0.003    
(0.011) 
 0.004    
(0.009) 
Rural  -0.004     
(0.012) 
-0.013*     
(0.008) 
-0.021**     
(0.009) 
-0.023**     
(0.010) 
  0.021     
(0.021) 
00.001     
(0.013) 
-0.005     
(0.016) 
-0.010     
(0.018) 
Economic situation 0.002    
(0.003) 
0.003**    
(0.002) 
0.001   
(0.002) 
0.002   
(0.002) 
 0.002    
(0.003) 
0.003**    
(0.002) 
0.001   
(0.002) 
0.002   
(0.002) 
















































Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observation 24,296 24,296 24,296 24,296  24,296 24,296 24,296 24,296 
Prob > F           =  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
h The coefficients are the marginal effects and standard errors in parenthesis. They are adjusted for clustering at the country level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 
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2 The weaker sex? Gender differences in punishment 
across Matrilineal and Patriarchal Societies 
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Abstract: This paper investigates the hypothesis that women are underrepresented in 
leadership roles due to a lower ability to influence others.  By comparing societies that differ 
in the inheritance rights of men and women, we trace the origins of such difference.  The 
results of a public good game with third party punishment indicate that in patriarchal societies 
there are persistent gender differences in social influence while in matrilineal societies these 
differences are smaller.  While in the patriarchal society sanctioning behavior is not different 
across genders, cooperation is lower in groups with a female monitor than a male monitor.  In 
contrast, in the matrilineal society male monitors sanction more often than female monitors, 
though cooperation does not depend on the gender of the monitor.  
 
Keywords: Gender, norm enforcement, culture, inequality, collective action 








2.1 Introduction  
Although the gender gap in education and labor market is narrowing, women continue to be 
underrepresented in leadership positions (Agarwal, 2000; Matsa and Miller, 2011).  Common 
explanations on this phenomena consider gender differences in risk aversion (Schubert et al., 
2000; Eckel and Grossman, 2002; Gysler et al., 2002; Fehr-Duda et al.,2006; Croson and 
Gneezy, 2009; Ertac and Gurdal, 2012), competitiveness (Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy and 
Rustichini, 2004;  Gupta et al., 2005; and Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007)  and self-confidence 
(Barber and Odean, 2001; Kamas and Preston, 2012). An alternative explanation that has 
received less attention in the economics literature is that women could have lower ability to 
influence others than do men.  In this paper we investigate gender differences in social 
influence comparing how the gender of the third party punisher affects cooperation in the 
group. Particularly, we consider whether female monitors are less likely to use sanctions to 
promote pro-social behavior than male monitors and consider whether the gender of the 
monitor affects cooperation.    
A relevant policy question is what causes gender differences in social influence.  This 
paper tests the hypothesis that the social environment shapes the beliefs and values regarding 
the appropriate role of women in society. Specifically, our hypothesis is that access to 
resources determines the status that women occupy in society and shape gender roles (Cole et 
al, 1992).   
To investigate the drivers of gender differences in the use of sanctions and on the ability 
to influence, we conducted an artefactual field experiment in two different societies in Ghana.  
In particular, we compare the patriarchal Ewe city of Ho of the Volta region of Ghana and the 
matrilineal Ashanti city of Kumasi in the Ashanti region of Ghana.  Prior to 1985, when a 
legal reform that promoted gender equality was passed, there were marked differences in the 
inheritance system across these two societies.  While in the patriarchal societies men were in 
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charge of family life: they controlled property, were the legal guardians of children, and even 
had the right to restrict their wives’ public activities (Htun and Weldon, 2011), in matrilineal 
societies, a woman's inheritance was acquired through the woman’s lineage giving women a 
relatively higher status (Fenrich and Higgins, 2001; Kutsoati and Morck, 2012).  Besides, 
unlike patriarchal societies, in the matrilineal society both daughters and sons inherited from 
their parents.  While it has been almost 30 years since these laws were launched, customary 
inheritance systems continue being widely used (Gedzi, 2012; Hacker, 2010).  This context 
provides us with a unique platform to examine the role of access to economic power on 
persistent gender disparities on social influence. 
Our experimental design is based on Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) and considers a public 
good game with third party punishment.  We use a 2x2x2 design that exogenously vary the 
gender of the third party punisher (male and female), the sanctioning technologies available 
for them (monetary and non-monetary sanctions) and the type of society (matrilineal and 
patriarchal).  We compare sanctioning behavior by male and female monitors across 
sanctioning technologies and societies and consider the effect of the identity of the third party 
punisher on contributions to the public good game.  Research from social psychology 
indicates that women tend to be less effective when using styles of communication that do not 
correspond to their gender stereotype.  Hence, we expect that the type of sanctioning 
mechanism used would affect the social influence of female monitors, but not from male 
monitors.  In particular, we expect that women would be more influential using non-monetary 
sanctions than monetary sanctions. 
Traditional economic models focus on individual behavior and do not take into account 
the utility that individuals derive from the utility or the actions of others.  Yet empirical 
evidence largely supports positive social interaction or peer effects (Manski, 1993; Conley 
and Udry, 2010; Jackson, 2010; Aral and Walker, 2012; Bond et al. 2012).  To understand the 
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role of social influence on decision making, behavioral economists consider how behavior of 
the “first mover” or leader affects the behavior of the followers. 9  For instance, in charity 
experiments, information on the value given by the previous donor affects donations of 
subsequent players (Potters et al., 2001; Alpizar et al., 2008; Alpizar and Martinsson, 2012).   
In the context of a public good game, it is shown that the decisions of the leader affects 
contributions of following players (Clark and Sefton, 2001; Meidinger and Villeval, 2002; 
Moxnes and van der Heijden, 2003; Potters et al., 2007). In the context of a modified trust 
game with one trustee and two trustees, Regner and Riener (2014) find that the behavior of 
the leading trustee influences the moral justification used by the follower for not reciprocating 
the help received.  While this literature provides important indications of social influence in a 
controlled environment, they do not consider how the degree of social influence depends on 
personal and socioeconomic characteristics of the people involved.   
Different characteristics of the agents involved in economic exchange have been shown 
to affect the outcome of economic interactions. For instance, it is shown that social distance 
defined as emotional proximity affects trust, cooperation and solidarity (see Bogardus, 1928; 
Berg et al., 1995; Buchan et al., 2006; Charness and Gneezy, 2008; Leider et al., 2009). Social 
preferences have also been shown to vary according to the feeling of identification that agents 
have with each other, or the extent of their shared identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). 
Empirical evidence largely supports in-group favoritisms and out-group discrimination 
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006).  Another dimension 
that has been shown to affect social interactions is status or the relative ranking of persons in 
a society (Ball et. al., 2001).  People with higher status seem to receive preferential treatment. 
Compared with low status individuals, high status individuals achieve better outcomes in 
bargaining games (Ball and Eckel, 1996, 1998), double auctions games (Ball et al, 2001),  and 
                                                            
9 For an extensive literature review of the social psychology literature on social influence see Carli (2001).   
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dictator games with third party punishment (von Essen and Ranehill, 2011).  Additionally, 
evidence suggests that status affects the degree of social influence in persuading others to 
follow advice (Moore, 1968), donate (Kumru and Vesterlund, 2010) or contribute in a public 
good game (Eckel et al., 2010).  
Complementary to the above research on social influence, we consider how gender of the 
parties affects social influence.  Research in social psychology, concludes that in most 
societies women are less influential than men (Carli, 2001).  They argue that as women have 
lower status than men and are expected to be more communal, people generally expect that 
men have more right to act as authorities than women do. Factors such as the gender 
composition of the individuals in an interaction; agents’ competences as dominance; warmth 
and communality; and the gender-typing of the task are found to mediate the effect of social 
influence.  Some economic experimental papers provide evidence on gender differences in the 
ability to exert influence on others.  In the context of a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. 
(2012) find that when married couples fill the questionnaire together, the joint decision is 
closer to those that men take when filling the questionnaire alone than those taken by women. 
Similar results are obtained regarding individual and joint elicitation of risk preferences (see 
de Palma et al, 2011; Carlsson et al, 2013).  In the literature on charities, it has been shown 
that women are more effective in eliciting donations than men (see Landry et al, 2006).   It 
has been shown that information on donations from women increase subsequent donations 
(Reinstein and Riener, 2012).  Grossman et al., (2012) show that information on the gender of 
the leader decreases a woman's willingness to become the first mover in a sequential public 
good game.  However, they find no significant gender differences in terms of influence on 
followers.  Although the aforementioned literature identifies some important areas in which 
social influence of men and women differs, relatively little research has been done on 
differences in the use of sanctions.  One notable exception is Barr and Kinsey (2002) who 
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investigate gender differences in giving criticisms to contributions of other group members.    
They find that there are no gender differences in sanctioning behavior across villagers in 
Zimbabwe.  However, her results indicate that women are more effective in imposing 
sanctions and inducing higher cooperation.   Our analysis complements this work examining 
how cultural factors affect sanctioning behavior.  
Recent experimental papers have explored the role of culture in shaping individual 
attitudes. This studies conclude that gender differences in competitiveness and risk aversion 
could be explained by the social environment (Lawrence, 2006; Barres, 2006; Gneezy et al, 
2009; Cardenas et al., 2012; Booth and Nolen, 2012; Gong and Yang, 2012).  Our study 
complements and extends the above studies by exploring the role of culture in explaining 
gender differences in the use of sanctions and social influence. 
Our results indicate that gender differences in the use of sanctions and ability to influence 
depend on inheritance systems.  In the patriarchal society, we find no significant differences 
in sanctioning behavior between male and female monitors independently of the type of 
sanctioning instrument used.  However, the degree of social influence, measured by 
contributions to the public good game is lower in groups with a female monitor compared to 
groups with a male monitor.  This result indicates that discrimination against women persists 
in patriarchal societies.   In contrast, male monitors tend to sanction more often than female 
monitors in the matrilineal society. This seems to indicate that men use power to 
counterbalance the higher status of women.  We do not, however, find significant differences 
in cooperation according to the gender of the punisher. Several model specifications, 
accounting for unconditional, conditional and dynamic effects robustly parallels the above 
findings.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a background of 
the two societies in which the experiments were conducted.  Section 2.3 describes the 
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experimental design.  Section 2.4 presents the hypothesis of the study. Section 2.5 presents 
the experimental procedure. Section 2.6 presents the results.  We finish with some concluding 
remarks.  
 
2.2 Local Background  
Historically, many Sub-Saharan African groups upheld the notion that men were in charge of 
family life: they controlled property, were the legal guardians of children, and had the right to 
restrict their wives’ public activities (Htun and Weldon, 2011). In these typical patriarchal 
groups, land inheritance is mostly traced through the father-line. Men tend to inherit from 
their fathers when they pass away, with little role for female children and female spouse in 
inheritance (see Adei, 2009; Takyi and Obeng-Gyimah, 2007). This form of inheritance 
system gives males, irrespective of their age, more power and authority than women. The 
Ewe tribe in Ghana located in the Volta region is historically a typical example of a 
patriarchal society.  
However, there are societies in Africa in which inheritance is acquired through the 
woman’s lineage. One typical example is the Ashanti matrilineal society in Ghana. The 
Ashanti tribe of Ghana which used to stretch across some parts of West Africa prior to 
colonization is an African society that operates under the matrilineal family system. Under the 
matrilineal system, the line of descent is traced through the female.  In the Ashanti matrilineal 
society, when a man dies, his sister’s children inherit his wealth instead of his own children.  
Women in the Ashanti society or extended family system are thought of to be more influential 
and thus have some control over land use rights. Evidence from matrilineal societies in Ghana 
shows that women in these societies prefer to pass on their lands rights to their daughters 
instead of their sons (Amanor, 2001).   
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In the quest to promote sex equality and expand individual rights, family laws in many 
countries were liberalized during the 20th century (Htun and Weldon, 2011). Ghana 
implemented various reforms to the family laws in 1985.10  Included in these laws is the 
provision that male and female children had equal rights to their parent’s wealth. The law 
further indicates that in the case where two or more persons are entitled to the same object or 
monies, they shall divide it among themselves in equal shares independent of the gender of 
the persons involved (Woodman, 1985). Under the interstate succession law, wives who 
would not have received anything directly from their husband's wealth under traditional 
customs receive a specific amount under this law. The Head of Family Law, also known as 
the Accountability Law, determines that husbands do not have economic power over their 
spouses. While these laws provide some form of protection for wives, its application has been 
limited and customary inheritance systems continue in many areas.  Legal reforms provide 
less protection for women in general, which could imply that cultural norms that discriminate 
against different genders still persist.   
 
2.3 Experimental Design  
Our experiment is based on a public good game with third party punishment. Upon 
arrival to the experimental session, participants are randomly allocated the role of contributors 
(C) or third party punishers or monitors (M).  Each contributor is randomly and anonymously 
matched in two independent groups simultaneously with two different contributors in each 
group.  Using numbers to represent each contributor, Figure 2.1 shows membership in the two 
matching groups.  Each contributor belongs simultaneously to the two groups that are formed 
by joining the vertical and horizontal lines.  For instance, contributor 4 forms one group with 
                                                            
10 Woodman (1985) presents a summary of the main reforms implemented in the Intestate Succession Law, 1985 
(P.N.D.C.L. 111); the Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Law, 1985 (P.N.D.C.L. 112); the 
Administration of Estates (Amendment) Law, 1985 (P.N.D.C.L. 113); and the Head of Family (Accountability) 
Law, 1985 (P.N.D.C.L. 114). 
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contributors 1 and 7 and monitor 1 and forms another group with contributors 5 and 6 and 
monitor 5.   
 
Figure 2.1 Matching groups 
 
 M1 M2 M3 
M4 C1 C2 C3 
M5 C4 C5 C6 
M6 C7 C8 C9 
 
Contributors receive an endowment of 250 pesewas (GhȻ) for each group and have to 
simultaneously decide the proportion they want to contribute to the public account (ci) in each 
of the two groups.11  Each pesewa invested in the public account yields a payoff of b=2/3 
pesewas (GhȻ) to each group member. The amounts not contributed are deposited in the 
subject’s private account which yields a return of one pesewa.   
Each of the matching groups is randomly assigned one external monitor.  Monitors 
receive a fix payment of 500 pesewas (GhȻ).  Their task is to observe contribution decisions 
and decide whether to punish group members. The monitor is external to the group and does 
not contribute to the public account, nor does she receive any payment from the public 
account.   Therefore, the monitor does not have any private incentive to induce cooperation.   
Similar to Masclet et al (2003), we use two punishment technologies: social sanction or 
non-monetary sanction and monetary sanction. Under the social sanction technology, the 
                                                            




central monitor can send a sad face to show disapproval for group members’ contributions.  
Social sanctions are costless for both sender and recipient (v=p=0).  Under the monetary 
punishment, the central monitor spends 8.33 pesewas to reduce the monetary payments of 
recipients by 25 pesewas (1:3) (p=1/3v; v=25).12  In this design, a monitor can send a 
maximum of only one sad face or monetary sanction to each subject in the group to show 
disapproval of contributions in each round. In summary, the pay-off for the monitor is given 
by: 




While the payoff for group members is given by:  









                            (2) 
where i and j refer to the participant and group s(he) belongs, respectively, and 𝑆 ∈ {0,1} 
indicates whether player 𝑖 was sanctioned or not.   
In our experiment, each contributor is exposed simultaneously to two monitors; one male 
and one female.  Following Figure 2.1, monitors 1, 2 and 3 are women (pink) while monitors 
4, 5 and 6 are male (blue). To make the gender of the monitors clear during the experiment, 
we sit female monitors in the front, and male monitors in the second row.  In addition, 
contributors made their decisions using pink and blue cards that were received by female or 
male monitors, respectively. While the composition of the group is known to the 
experimenter, subjects do not know the exact identities of the other two members of their 
groups. We keep the matching group and roles constant over the experiment. 
                                                            
12 We used a 1:3 constant sanctioning cost scheme across all rounds. The constant 1:3 sanctioning scheme 
simplifies the experimental structure for the non-student population in our experiment. Similar applications of 
the constant sanctioning cost scheme across rounds can be found in Sefton et al. (2007) and Baldassarri and 
Grossman, (2011).   
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This public good game is repeated over 10 rounds. After each round, contributors receive 
feedback on whether they were sanctioned or not. They also receive information on group 
contributions and payoffs for that round.  At the end of the 10 rounds, one round is randomly 
selected for payment. This approach as argued by Fischbacher et al. (2001) gives subjects a 
monetary incentive to take all the decisions seriously and to ensure that potentially all 
decisions can become contributions to a public good. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the treatments used in the experiment. Our design combines a 
within and between subject design.  Each contributor is simultaneously exposed to a female 
and a male monitor. Yet each participant is exposed to only one type of sanction: non-
monetary or monetary. Furthermore, we included a control group in which there are no 
monitors and no opportunities for sanctioning.  Finally, we explore exogenous variation in the 
social environment and conduct the experiments in the patriarchal and matrilineal Volta and 
Ashanti regions. 
 
Table 2.1. Experimental design 
 Patriarchal Society Matrilineal Society 
Type  of  Sanction Female Monitor Male Monitor Female  Monitor Male  Monitor 
Non-Monetary No_Mon_FP No_Mon_MP No_Mon_FM No_Mon_MM 
Monetary  Mon_FP Mon_MP Mon_FM Mon_MM 
No Sanction Control_P  Control_M  
 
  
The above game could be solved recursively.  The monitor has to decide whether to 
sanction or not.  Yet, as monetary sanctioning are costly, the optimal response is not to 
sanction. As the expected cost of sanctions is zero, the expected marginal pay-off of the 
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public good is the same with social and monetary sanctioning. In both cases, individually it is 
optimal not to contribute to the public good as the marginal return from contributions are 
lower than the return from investing in the individual account: 𝜕𝜋𝑖 𝜕𝑐𝑖1 ⁄ = 𝜕𝜋𝑖 𝜕𝑐𝑖
2
 ⁄  − 1 +
𝑏 < 0.  However, since 0 < 𝑏 < 1 < 𝑐𝑏, the social optimum is to contribute all endowments 
into the group account: 𝜕𝜋𝑖 𝜕𝑐𝑖1 ⁄ = 𝜕𝜋𝑖 𝜕𝑐𝑖
2
 ⁄ =  −1 + 𝑐𝑏 > 0.  
It has been consistently found that behavior in the public good game differs 
systematically from the predictions of rational decision making. Our experimental design 
allows us to explore whether the deviation from the predicted behavior can be related with 
personal characteristics of the monitor.  Moreover, we explore how culture mediates these 
effects. In the next section, we present the main hypothesis of the study. 
 
2.4 Hypothesis  
Evidence supports the positive effect of sanctions on cooperation.  It has been shown that 
when contributors have the possibility to sanction other group members, cooperation is higher 
(Fehr and Gächter 2000; Carpenter, 2007, Masclet et al., 2003).  The presence of a third party 
punisher has also been shown to lead to higher contribution levels (Baldassarri and Grossman, 
2011; Kube and Traxler, 2011).  Hence, our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1:  Contributions are higher in treatments where there is a third party monitor 
compared with the control treatment without it. 
Sociological literature has found that status affects behavior in various ways (Berger et al, 
1972). For example, Hoff et al. (2011) observe that lower status individuals exhibit a much 
lower willingness to sanction violation of norms.  Our second hypothesis is: 
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Hypothesis 2:  Status of genders in society is reflected in sanctioning use. High status 
individuals are more likely to use sanctions than low status individuals.  
Empirical evidence suggests that people behave more generously towards a high status person 
than a low status person. For instance, Kumru and Vesterlund (2010) find that contributions 
are larger when high status individual contribute prior to (rather than after) a low status 
individual.  Similar results are provided by Ball and Eckel (1996) on the context of a 
bargaining game. In a market auction, Ball et al. (2001) find that when buyers have a higher 
status than sellers, equilibrium market prices are lower.   Based on this evidence, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Contributions will be higher when interacting with high status monitors, 
than low status monitors. 
Sociological literature argues that one method in which individuals maintain their high status 
is to disobey individuals who impose sanctions on them. Thus, people of higher status are 
believed to have the right to make demands of those of lower status, and people of lower 
status are expected to comply with these demands (Eagly, 1983). Henrich and Gil-White 
(2001) further argue that high status entails greater access to desirable things and that access 
is not actively resisted by low status individuals. Hence, one would expect that in patriarchal 
societies, males, the high status gender, would be less responsive to female than to male 
monitors, while the opposite would be true in the matrilineal case.   
  Hypothesis 4:  The higher gender status contributes less to monitors from the lower 
gender status than to monitors from high gender status. 
It has been argued that access to resources and income affects the relative status that people 
receive in the social hierarchy (Cole et al., 1992; Corneo and Jeanne, 2001). Hence, 
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inheritance systems that favor one gender over the other in terms of control of resources gives 
that gender a relatively higher status than the other.     
  Hypothesis 5:  We expect that the inheritance system will mediate the status that men 
and women have in the society.  In societies where inheritance systems favor men like 
patriarchal societies in Ghana, men would have higher status than women.  In matrilineal 
societies in which the right of men and women to inherit is more equal, differences in 
status across genders would be smaller. 
Sociological literature indicates that the ability to influence others is mediated by gender 
stereotypes (Carli, 2001).  If women use styles of communications that do not conform to 
what people expect from them, they are less influential. Women who used more direct and 
persuasive messages are less effective in influence than indirect messages while the opposite 
was true for men (Burgoon et al, 1975; Carli, 1990).  The expression of disagreement by 
women tended to evoke more negative reactions than when such behavior is expressed by 
men. This lead to our final hypothesis:  
  Hypothesis 6:  We expect that women would be more influential and elicit higher 
levels of contribution when using non-monetary sanctions than monetary sanctions. 
 
2.5 Experimental Procedure 
Our field experiments were conducted during the summer of 2012 in different locations in the 
city of Ho, the capital of the patriarchal Volta Region in the eastern part of Ghana (a region 
where the Ewe tribe lives) and the city of Kumasi, the capital of the matrilineal Ashanti region 
in the middle of Ghana. The experiment was conducted in five randomly selected areas in 
each city.  
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We recruited participants prior to the experiments.  The workshop was announced 
during regular meetings of the association of assembly men and women with their 
communities.  People volunteered to participate and when the number of volunteers was high, 
a lottery was played to select who would participate.  Participants were notified of the venue 
and time of the next experimental session either in person or by a telephone call. The 
experimental sessions were normally conducted in the local school or at community centers.  
In total, 156 subjects participated in the experiment.  In a typical session, there were 
15 subjects.  9 subjects were randomly matched in 6 different groups while the remaining 6 
participants were given the role of external monitors. Overall, 1,440 contribution decisions 
were made. Group assignments remained the same for the entire duration of the session 
(partner’s protocol).  Each subject participated in only one session. A session lasted 
approximately 3 hours (on average) with an average earning of 7GhȻ (€3)13.  
 
2.6 Results   
2.6.1 Demographic characteristics of monitors and non-monitors 
Table 2.2 summarizes demographic characteristic and community participation variables for 
both monitors and non-monitors in the experiment across the two locations. There are equal 
numbers of female and male monitors under the gender treatments across the two localities. 
Unlike the student population sample used in many experiments, the average age of most 
participants in this study falls within an older age range of 30 to 45 years. Our participants 
have on average 3 years of schooling.  Overall, there were more male participants in the 
experiment than female participants across both localities. Lastly, subjects in the Ashanti 
location appear slightly more religious than subjects in the Volta location.  
                                                            
13 Daily wage at the time was 4.48 GhȻ. The average earnings were close to two days of work. 
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Table 2.2 Demographic Characteristics (Volta And Ashanti) 




(Mean) (Mean) (Mean) 
 
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) 
1. Monitor 
   Age 35.2 39.8 30.5 
 
(14.4) (16.5) (10.0) 
Educational Level 3.5 3.6 3.3 
 (1.1) (1.1) (1.1) 
Gender 1.5 1.5 1.5 
 (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
Marital status 1.7 1.7 1.8 
 
(0.8) (0.6) (0.9) 
Hours spent in church/mosque 4.9 4.3 5.6 
                                               (6.8) (2.7) (9.1) 
2. Non-Monitor 
   Age 37.3 40.9 33.7 
 (15.6) (17.6) (12.3) 
Educational Level 3.5 3.6 3.3 
 (1.1) (1.1) (1.1) 
Gender  1.6 1.6 1.6 
 (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
Marital status 1.7 1.6 1.7 
 (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) 
Hours spent in church/mosque 5.7 4.6 6.7 
 (8.0) (5.6) (9.6) 
N 156 78 78 
Note: Age denotes actual age in years; educational level (1-6) denotes: (1) No education, (2) Primary School, (3) Some high 
school, (4) Completed high school, (5) Undergraduate university, (6) Postgraduate university; Not together for any reason, 




2.6.2 Use of sanctions and gender  
The descriptive statistics of the number of sanctions imposed by male and female monitors is 
presented in Table 2.3. We find that contrary to the predictions, both monetary and non-
monetary sanctions are used.  In about 10 percent of the decisions monitors imposed 
sanctions.  As expected, non-monetary sanctions are more frequently used than monetary 
sanctions.  However, we find that the extent to which sanctions are used vary across locations.  
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In the Ashanti matrilineal society where women have more economic power and influence, 
we observe that female monitors sanction significantly less than male monitors (overall, 
Wilcoxon rank sum test Z = 4.192, p < 0.000).  This result is independent of whether the 
sanctioning mechanism is costly (monetary) (Z = 2.198, p = 0.028) or not (social sanctioning) 
(Z = 4.643, p < 0.000).  
Table 2.3 Sanctioning Behavior (Gender Treatment)a 
 








(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) 
Gender  Pooled No_Mon  Mon Pooled No_Mon Mon 
Female 41 25 16 26 18 8 
 
0.114 0.139 0.089 0.072 0.100 0.044 
 
[0.017] [0.026] [0.021] [0.014] [0.022] [0.015] 
Male 37 25 12 68 49 19 
 
0.103 0.139 0.067 0.189 0.272 0.106 
 
[0.016] [0.026] [0.019] [0.021] [0.033] [0.023] 
Total   78 50 28 94 67 19 
Significance       - - - *** *** ** 
a Standard errors in parentheses.  *p < 0.1**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.0.1, two- tailed tests 
 
In the patriarchal Volta locality, we observe that female monitors sanction more than male 
monitors when the sanctioning mechanism is costly (monetary). However, this difference is 
not statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test Z = 0.786, p = 0.432, two-tailed). There 
also seem to be no significant differences in social sanctioning between female and male 
monitors when the sanctioning mechanism is non-monetary (social) sanctioning. Pooling the 
sanctions across the two different sanctioning mechanisms, we still do not observe significant 
differences in sanctioning between female monitors and male monitors (Wilcoxon rank sum 
test Z = 0.479, p = 0.632, two-tailed). Thus, women monitors in the Volta location 
(patriarchal society) punishes as much as male monitors. We reject the general hypothesis that 
females are less likely than male to punish norm violators.  
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The simple descriptive analysis does not consider that differences in sanctioning behavior 
could also be due to differences in compliance. Hence, in the next section we use econometric 
analysis to control for this effect. To account for other factors that could affect sanctioning, 
we run a panel probit model.   
Probit regression estimates 
(1)  𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑐 𝑏𝑏 𝑚𝐶𝑐𝑖𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑔,𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑒𝐹𝐶𝑐𝑖𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑔,𝑡 + 𝛾 ,𝑋𝑔,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑔,𝑡 
where the dependent variable equal 1 if the monitor gave a sanction to a group member 𝑔 and 
period is 𝑡. The indicator dummy variable 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑒𝐹𝐶𝑐𝑖𝑡𝐶𝐶 equals 1 if the monitor is a 
female; the 𝑋𝑔,𝑡 depending on the model includes controls for current period contribution and 
lagged contribution.  
Table 2.4 presents the results of the estimations in each of the societies under 
consideration. We find that irrespective of model specification, female monitors in the 
matrilineal locality are significantly less likely to sanction compared with male monitors. In 
the patriarchal case, however, we do not observe significant differences in the likelihood of 
sanctioning between female and male monitors. Consistent with theory, we also observe from 









Table 2.4. Panel Probit Regressions for Sanctioning Behavior 





 (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  
Monetary -0.386** -0.523**     -0.650***    -0.746*** 
 
(0.183) (0.243) (0.195) (0.229) 
Female -0.145 -0.268 -0.958***    -1.051***    
 (0.157) (0.211) (0.177) (0.221) 









Contribution -1.588*** -1.596***    -1.553***    -1.556***    
 
(0.162) (0.163) (0.178) (0.178) 
Lagged contri.  -0.142 -0.140 -0.034 -0.035 
 
(0.147) (0.148) (0.146) (0.146) 
Period 0.103*** 0.104***    -0.088*** -0.088***    
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.029) (0.03) 
 # Observations 716 716 716 716 
Prob > chi2   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood -168.133 -167.747 -167.295 -161.881 
aStandard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
 
These results indicate that contrary to our expectations, female and male monitors in 
the patriarchal society are not different in the use of sanctions.  However, in the matrilineal 
society, where we expected to find lower differences in the use of sanctions between genders, 
male monitors sanction more often than female monitors.  If we are to believe that sanctioning 
is related to status, this would indicate that men have a higher status than women.  
  
2.6.3 Impact of sanctions on cooperation 
Figure 2.2 graphically presents the average contributions to the public good for different 
genders of the monitoring and sanctioning technologies.  Panels A and B refer to the Volta 
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region, the patriarchal society; while Panels C and D refer to the matrilineal society.  We 
compare contributions with the control treatment when there are no opportunities to sanction.  
We observe a general positive trend in contributions under both monetary as well as social 
sanctioning institutions. Contributions of endowment under the sanctioning institutions (both 
non-monetary and monetary sanctions) averages a little over 60 percent in the first period and 
gradually increases, approaching full cooperation in latter periods for both female monitors 
and male monitors. In contrast, the average contribution in the no sanction treatment starts 
from below 40 percent and gradually decays to about 20 percent by the last period. Thus, as 
can be seen in Figure 2.2, the presence of sanctioning opportunities enhances pro-social 



















Figure 2.2 Average contributions across periods 
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2.6.4 Social influence of the monitor  
The social influence of the monitor can be captured by the degree of cooperation in the public 
good game.  Table 2.5 presents the average contributions to the group account for groups with 
male and female monitors under the different sanction technologies. We find that in the 
patriarchal location, Volta, when sanctioning is costly, there are no significant differences 
between contributions to the group account in the presence of female or male monitors 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test,  Z = 1.030, p = 0.152, one-tailed test). However, we do observe 
significant differences in contributions to the group account under non-monetary (social) 
sanctioning. Participants contributed significantly more when they have   male monitors than 
when they had female monitors (Wilcoxon rank sum test, Z = 1.434, p = 0.076, one-tailed 
test). As discuss previously, male and female monitors are equally likely to use sanctioning 
mechanisms.  Hence, this difference is not due to a disciplining effect of the sanction.  When 
contributions are pooled across sanctioning types, a much stronger difference in contribution 
is observed. Thus, in the patriarchal region, locality average contributions to the group 
account with female monitors are significantly lower than with male monitors (Wilcoxon rank 
sum test, Z = 1.735, p = 0.041, one-tailed test).  
In the matrilineal location, Ashanti, we observe no significant differences in the 
contributions to the group account under either female or male monitors.  This result holds for 
both monetary and non-monetary (social) sanctioning (Wilcoxon rank sum test, Z = 0.485, p 
= 0.314 and Z = 0.492, p = 0.3114, respectably).  Also, we observe no significant differences 
when the data is pooled across sanctioning mechanisms (Wilcoxon rank sum test, Z = 0.070, 
p = 0.472).   As discussed previously, male monitors are more likely to sanction in the 






Table 2.5 Mean Subjects Contributions (Gender) 





 (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) 
Gender Pooled No_Mon Mon Pooled No_Mon Mon 
Female 1.991 2.008 1.973 1.963 1.926 2.001 
 
(0.028) (0.042) (0.038) (0.031) (0.045) (0.041) 
Male 2.064 2.091 2.037 1.966 1.906 2.026 
 
(0.026) (0.037) (0.036) (0.031) (0.045) (0.041) 
 z-value z =1.735** z = 1.434* z = 1.030 z = 0.070 z = 0.492 z = 0.485 
N   720 360 360 720 360 360 
a Standard errors are in parentheses. NMP denotes non-monetary sanctions and MP denotes monetary sanctions 
 
In order to test the effect of demographic characteristics of the monitor on contributions 
to the public good, we use panel data analysis.  Given the right-censoring in the data, we use a 
panel Tobit model.  Ordinary least squares in this case will yield biased estimates, as the 
individual contributions are bounded from below by 0 and from above by 250.  The empirical 
strategy adopted here is to first estimate and present the unconditional results based on the 
main treatment variables (dummy variable for gender, dummy for the type of sanctioning 
mechanism and the period). Because our experimental design in principle is a 2x2 design, we 
also present conditional regression results accounting for the interaction of the monitor's 
gender and the type of sanctioning. This interaction may account for the possibility that the 
social influence of male or female monitors is different depending on the sanctioning 
mechanism in place.  
Aside from the use of the panel regression to capture the underlying panel nature of the 
data, we also acknowledge the presence of dynamic incentives in the experiment. Therefore, 
we also include various forms of lagged variables (i.e. lagged sanctions, lagged contributions 
of others) in other specifications.  As part of this effort, we account for both dynamics as well 
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as censoring in our data. We also carried out other specification checks by controlling for 
differences in all observable demographic variables defined in Table 2.2. The specifications 
serve as a robustness check for our main result.  
Tobit Regression estimate 
(2)  𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑏𝐶𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑐𝑐 𝑏𝑏 𝑔𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝐶𝑔,𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑒𝐹𝐶𝑐𝑖𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑔,𝑡 + 𝛾 ,𝑋𝑔,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑔,𝑡 
where the dependent variable is the contribution of a group member 𝑔 and period is 𝑡. The 
indicator dummy variable 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑒𝐹𝐶𝑐𝑖𝑡𝐶𝐶 equals 1 if monitored by a female; the 𝑋𝑔,𝑡 
depending on the model includes controls for lagged sanctions, lagged contribution, 
demographic characteristics of the group member.  
 
Our estimation result as presented in Table 2.6 parallels the conclusions derived from the 
non-parametric statistics discussed earlier. Model 1 presents the unconditional effect of the 
monitor's gender on individuals contributions (female =1 and male =0, monetary sanction = 1, 
non-monetary (social) sanction = 0). Results from Model 1 replicate the results from the 
parametric test.  In Volta, subjects contribute significantly less to female monitors than to 
male monitors (p < 0.05) whereas in Ashanti, the contribution levels are not significantly 
different for groups with female and male monitors.    
Model 2 provides the conditional effect by including an interaction term of monitor’s 
gender and sanctioning type. Controlling for female-sanctioning-type interaction, we find that 
the gender effect persists in the patriarchal society (p < 0.05) so contributions to the public 
good are lower when the monitor is female.  Model 3 further includes lagged sanctions and 
lagged contributions of others variables to attempt to capture some of the dynamic incentives 
inherent in the data over the periods of the experiment. As expected, we find that reciprocity 
explains cooperation.  Hence, contributions depend positively on lagged contributions of 
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others in the group.  Yet, the gender effect still persists in the Volta Region (p < 0.10).  Model 
4 further controls for the differences in observable demographic characteristics of the 
participants, i.e., gender of contributor, age, education, marital status, and religion. After 
controlling for observable differences in the demographic characteristics of group members, 
the effect of gender of the monitor becomes much stronger (p < 0.05). It is interesting to note 
that in Volta, male participants contribute less when the monitor is female and when sanctions 
are monetary than when they are non-monetary.  As we control for the leverage of the 
sanction, this indicates that male contributors disregard female monitors when sanctions are 
costly as opposed to when they are not. The Ashanti region seems to favor a meritocracy rule, 
so male contributors are less likely to contribute to the public good when they have lower 
education.   
Irrespective of which model specification is chosen, subjects in Volta contribute 
significantly less to the public good when confronting a female monitor than a male monitor.  
Yet as male and female monitors use sanctioning equally, the higher contributions that male 
monitors can achieve cannot be attributed to different levels of enforcement. Our results 
indicate that differences in the effectiveness of female monitors can be attributed to cultural 
differences.  In the matrilineal society where women are more empowered, we find no 
significant differences in the level of contributions to the public good in groups with male and 




Table 2.6 Tobit Regressions of Participant's Contributions 
 Loc. Volta- Patriarchal 
 Loc. Ashanti- Matrilineal 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Monetary -0.142 -0.132 -0.063 -0.167  0.200 0.202 0.274 0.237 
 (0.139) (0.142) (0.236) (0.236)  (0.193) (0.207) (0.304) (0.197) 
Female Monitor -0.099** -0.102* -0.188** -0.125**  0.004 0.036 0.123 0.040 
 (0.042) (0.059) (0.096) (0.060)  (0.038) (0.054) (0.102) (0.053) 
Monetary  0.037 0.183 0.050   -0.059 -0.109 -0.076 
× Female Monitor  (0.081) (0.120) (0.083)   (0.077) (0.129) (0.077) 
Lagged sanction  -0.160** -0.155**    0.006 0.005  
  (0.067) (0.067)    (0.061) (0.061)  
Lagged contri. Others  0.133** 0.139**    -0.011 -0.001  
  (0.061) (0.061)    (0.060) (0.061)  
Male Monitor   0.077     0.370  
× Male Contributor   (0.219)     (0.283)  
Female Monitor   0.138     -0.120  
× Male Contributor   (0.122)     (0.120)  
Monetary× Female Monitor   -0.291*     0.053  
× Male Contributor.   (0.166)     (0.163)  
Period 0.069*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.069***  0.076*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.076*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Constant 1.895*** 1.765*** 1.760*** 1.909***  1.597*** 1.791*** 2.486*** 1.579*** 
 (0.108) (0.154) (0.506) (0.111)  (0.142) (0.177) (0.598) (0.143) 
Other controls No No Yes No  No No Yes No 
# Observations 720 648 648 720  720 648 648 720 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -584.864 -486.324 -486.324 -483.919  -522.928 -440.491 -433.139 -522.436 
                                               e Standard errors are in parentheses:  *p < 0.1**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
Notes: Contributions are bound from below by 0 and above by 2.5. Other controls refer to controlling for all other demographic variables defined in Table 2 
57 
 
Note that despite similar contributions to male monitors and female monitors in the 
matrilineal Ashanti society as observed from both non-parametric statistics and the model 
specifications, evidence from Table 2.3 and 2.4 indicates that male monitors in the matrilineal 
Ashanti region sanction significantly more than the female monitors. Thus, female monitors 
in Ashanti do not have to sanction as often as male monitors to induce similar levels of 
cooperation. Empirical results from the above specification support the hypothesis of the 
impact of culture on gender differences in social influence.  
 
2.6.5 Summary of the results and hypothesis test 
The results of the study confirm our hypothesis regarding the effectiveness of sanctioning 
mechanisms on cooperation (Hypothesis 1).  Yet, contrary to our expectations we find that the 
relative social status of men and women is not reflected in different use of sanctions 
(Hypothesis 2).  In the patriarchal society, male and female monitors are equally likely to use 
sanctions, while in the matrilineal society, male monitors sanction more often.  Identity threat 
could explain this behavior.  As it is socially expected that women are more powerful than 
men, male monitors might need to contest this expectation exerting power. This is however a 
question that requires further research. 
One of our hypotheses was that status would affect social influence (Hypothesis 3).  
Consistent with our hypothesis, we see that in our patriarchal societies, contributions were 
lower in groups with female monitors compared with groups with male monitors.   Also, 
consistently with our expectations, we find no significant differences in cooperation in groups 
with male and female monitors in our matrilineal societies.  
We find some support to the hypothesis that participant's status matter in the degree of 
social influence (Hypothesis 4).  In particular, we find that in patriarchal societies, male 
contributors discriminate against female monitors and cooperate less in groups led by a 
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female monitor compared with groups led by male monitors.    Also, male participants 
contribute less than female participants when monetary sanctions are in place. Interestingly, 
we find that in the patriarchal society, female contributors also discriminate against female 
monitors particularly when non-monetary sanctions are in place.  Our results do not support 
any such difference in the matrilineal society. 
Our results partly support Hypothesis 5. We find that gender differences in the use of 
sanctions and social influence are not constant across these two societies. This result suggests 
that culture, and in particular, inheritance systems are important in shaping social status and 
determining the gender roles in society.  Yet, differences in social status are not manifested 
across all dimensions. Status differences are not necessarily reflected in the use of sanctions 
but on social influence.   
Our results support Hypothesis 5. In the patriarchal society, we find gender differences in 
the degree of social influence depending on the type of sanctions being used.  Women 
discriminate against other women cooperating less when sanctions are non-monetary. Male 
contributors discriminate against female monitors when sanctions are monetary. We do not 
find such effect in matrilineal societies.  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
Chipping-away the glass ceiling for women especially those in developing countries has 
strong policy implication for the overall goal of gender empowerment and economic 
development around the world. The goal of this paper was to use a controlled experiment in 
the field to examine the impact of gender on norm enforcement and collective action 
outcomes in two distinct societies; one matrilineal, and the other patriarchal. The two 
inheritance systems in these societies provide a unique platform to examine the use of 
sanctions and social influence of women in society.  
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 We find that in the matrilineal society where women have control and power in 
inheritance and as such have high status within the society, subjects tend to contribute the 
same to groups monitored and sanctioned by females and males alike.  On the other hand, 
subjects in the patriarchal society tend to contribute significantly less to groups monitored and 
sanctioned by women. However, we find that the differences in monitoring outcomes is not 
attributed to gender differences in sanctioning, as female and male monitors in the patriarchal 
society show similar sanctioning behavior.  These results therefore refute the general 
hypothesis that women or lower status individuals exhibit a much lower willingness to 
sanction norm violation (see Hoff et al, 2011; Balafoutas and Nikiforakas, 2012). The 
evidence squares well with the notion that cultural factors are responsible for a low 
representation of women in positions of authority. Thus, the negative impact of women’s 
monitors on collective action may be driven more by factors that are external to the woman.  
 
These findings provide strong implication for public policy. Overall, we argue strongly in 
favor of “breaking the glass ceiling”. However, we also argue that policy makers should bear 
in mind that placing women in positions of authority alone, i.e. “chipping-away at the glass 
ceiling” does not automatically lead to superior outcomes but more policy and institutional 
commitment would be needed to support this change. Our results, together with other papers 
that compare behavior in matrilineal and patriarchal societies point to a robust relationship 
between gender, culture and economic outcomes. Our results are also a testament to the 
presence of a strong gender-inequality-differential within countries. We argue that policies 
that promote the welfare of women and the aged (e.g., economic participation and decision-
making power) especially in developing countries should take inequality differences within 










Hello and welcome to the workshop. Thank you all very much for making time to come to 
this workshop. We really do appreciate. In this workshop you will have the option to earn 
some money. How much money you earn will depend on your decision and the decision of 
others in the group.  Money earned in the workshop will be paid to you in cash at the end of 
the workshop.  During this workshop you will be asked to perform a task.  We will explain to 
you the task at its due time.  In total the workshop will last about 2 hours.   
Before we start the different tasks, we please ask that you all come to the front of the room so 
we can reorganize the seats.   
Please do not open the envelops on the table. 
In order to maintain comparability across different participants in the workshop we have 
prepared some instructions that we will read to you.  
For the task, you will have different roles in the workshop. Some of you will be called 
‘workers’ and others will be called ‘inspectors’.   
What do workers need to do? 
For the next task, you will have different roles in the workshop. Some of you will be called 
‘workers’ and others will be called ‘inspectors’.   
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Each worker will be assigned to two independent groups ‘Group Pink’ and ‘Group Blue’. 
Each group consists of three participants; you and two others participants. You will not know 
who is in each of the groups you belong.  
Each worker will receive Ȼ2.5  for each group they belong. So in total you will receive Ȼ5. In 
each group there is a group account. Your task is to decide how much you want to invest in 
the  group account and how much to put in your pocket. Whatever money you put in your 
pocket will multiply by one. The money that you invest in the group account will be 
multiplied by two and will be equally shared by the three group members.  Similarly, the 
money that other group members invest in the group account will be multiply by two and will 
be equally shared among the three group members.  
You have to make this decision for your ‘Pink Group’and  as well as for your ‘Blue Group’.  
You will receive two decision cards like these ones (show example).  The pink card refers to  
group Pink, while the light blue card refers to the group Blue.  The cards have boxes with the 
numbers, ranging from 10 pesewa to Ȼ 2.5.Your task is to ‘circle’ the amount of money that 
you want to invest into the group account.  For instance if you want to invest all your Ȼ 2.5, 
then you need to circle Ȼ 2.5. If you want to invest only 10 pesewas , then you circle 10p. The 
money that is not invested in the group account will be automatically transferred to your 
private pocket. Let’s demonstrate with the following example (use posters):: 
Example1: 
Assume that you invested 60pesewas into the Group Pink and kept Ȼ 1.90 in your pocket.  
Hence in the decision card for Group Pink, pink, you ‘circle’ 60p.  For ‘Group Blue’, let’s 
assume that you invested 80pesewas into the group account and kept Ȼ 1.70 in your pocket.  
Now in the decision card for group blue, light blue card, you ‘circle’ 80p. How much do you 
receive?  Well, what you earn will depend on how much money you and the other two 
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subjects in each group invested in the group account and how much money each person kept 
in their own pockets. If the others did exactly the same as you, and invested  60p each to 
Group Pink’s account and 80p to Group Blue’s account, the total investment in the Group 
Pink’s account  will be: 60p*3=Ȼ1.8 and in Group Blue is 80p*3= Ȼ 2.4.  Your earning from 
Group Pink would be Ȼ 1.90 + Ȼ 1.8*2/3 = Ȼ 3.10. And how much would you earn from 
Group Blue?  Ȼ 1.70+ Ȼ 2.4*2/3 = Ȼ 3.30.  
Example2: 
Assume that for ‘Group Pink’ you invested 0pesewa into the group account and kept all  
Ȼ2.50 in your pocket.  Hence in the decision card for Group Pink, pink, you ‘circle’ 0p.  If the 
other two participants in Group Pink invested on average Ȼ2.0  into the Group Pink Account,   
then the total amount of money in Group Pink account is 0p+ Ȼ 2*2= Ȼ 4.  And your earnings 
from Group Pink is Ȼ 2.5 + 4*2/3 =  Ȼ 5.17. 
For ‘Group Blue’, let’s assume that you invested Ȼ 2.5 into the group account in ‘Group Blue’ 
and kept nothing in your pocket.  Now in the decision card for group blue, light blue card, you 
‘circle’ Ȼ2.5. If the other participants in Group Blue invested on an  average invested 0p each 
into the group account, the total amount of money in the group account would be Ȼ2.5+0p*2= 
Ȼ2.5. How much would your earnings be?  0p + 2.5* 2/3 = Ȼ 1.67 
After making your decision as a worker on the Decision Cards, the assistant will pass by to 
collect the decision cards and send them to the inspectors.   
What do inspectors need to do? 
The job of the inspectors is to observe workers group investment and to fill a report. For 
carrying out this task the inspectors will receive Ȼ5.0. After observing each worker’s 
investment to the group account, the inspector has the opportunity to show dissatisfaction or 
disapproval of any worker’s investment level to the group account. If the inspector is 
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dissatisfied, the inspector can send one sadface to one worker.  Each inspector will observe 
decisions for ONLY one group.   
 
After the inspectors have made their decision workers will receive two REPORTS. One from 
the inspector for group pink and one from the inspector for group blue. The REPORT is at the 
back of the DECISION CARDS. The inspectors will also put the sadface if any, in the middle 
of the report card and fold it (Demonstrate) to be sent to the workers. The report card looks 
like this one (show with example on poster). In the report workers will see how much money 
in total is investment in the group account and how much money each person receives back 
from the group account.  
Let’s consider our last example.  Two of the ‘workers’ invested 0p in the group account and 
the other invested all Ȼ 2.5 into the group account. Hence the inspector needs to write: 
 
Total investment in the group account: Ȼ2.5.  
 
We double the total investment in the group account, so the group account now has Ȼ5.  This 
value is divided equally among all the three participants in the group. In this case, everyone 




















The inspectors also have to complete an ‘Inspector History Form’. The inspectors have to 
complete the ‘Inspector History Form’ first which looks like this one (show example and 
explain on poster) before completing the report cards for each of the three participants. 
 
Let’s demonstrate how the ‘Inspector History Form’ should be completed by the inspectors:   
Let’s consider our last example.  Let’s assume ‘worker1’ and ‘worker 2’ are those who 
invested 0p in the group account and ‘worker 3 invested all Ȼ 2.5 into the group account. 
Let’s assume the inspector sent a sadface picture to ´worker 2’. Hence the inspector needs to 




 1 2 3 Total Investment 
Investment group 
account 0 0 Ȼ 2.5 Ȼ2.5 
Sad Face  1   
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Total investment in the group account: Ȼ2.5. When the inspectors’ finishes completing the 
‘Inspector History Form’ and the report cards, our assistants will come round and collect 
them.  
 
This process will be repeated a total of 10 rounds. At the end of the 10 rounds, one round will 
be selected at random for payment in cash. The money you receive will be yours to take home 
and use as you please.  
 
<CONTROL QUESTIONS> 
Before starting the third task, we would like to verify that we had been clear in explaining the 
task.   
Please open envelope 1 and solve the questions.   
Imagine that you are a worker and want to invest Ȼ1.2 in the group account.  1. Please 
















10p 20p 30p 40p 50p 
 
60p 70p 80p 90p Ȼ1.0 
 
Ȼ1.10 Ȼ1.20 Ȼ1.30 Ȼ1.40 Ȼ1.50 
 
Ȼ1.60 Ȼ1.70 Ȼ1.80 Ȼ1.90 Ȼ2.0 
 
Ȼ2.10 Ȼ2.20 Ȼ2.30 Ȼ2.40 Ȼ2.50 
 
 
Assume the other two group members together contributed 60p each into the group account. 
1. How much money is left in your pocket after investing?  
2. How much money (payback) will you receive from the group account? 
3. How much money will you receive in total? 
4. How much money will you receive if the inspector sends you a sadface? 
Please open envelope 2 and solve the second question.   
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Imagine that you are an inspector for a group and observed that two people invested Ȼ1.50 
each in the group account and the other invested 0p in the group account. Please represent this 
case using the following REPORT CARD. 
       REPORT CARD 














 <Random selection into roles> 
Now we will continue by separating some of you to be ‘workers’ and others to be 
‘inspectors’. As I told you before, some of you will serve as inspectors. Please all the women 
should kindly come forward (select 3 randomly if there are more than 3 participants).  Please 
bring all your belongings along.  Now I would like to please ask all the men to kindly come to 
the front (select 3 randomly if there are more than 3 participants). We would like to ask the 
women among you to sit on the front row and the men to sit on the chairs on the second row. 
Actual Task 
Now we will start the third task. Please, participants who are sitting behind the second row 
‘workers’ should open envelop 3 and take out decision card pink and light blue for round 1. 
The pink card will be observed by one of the women participants in the first row and the blue 
card will be observed by one of the men participants sitting in the second row. Please when 
finish making your decisions; turn the decisions sheets upside down on the table so our 
assistants can collect them. Please begin by making your first investment decisions into group 





Please open envelop 4.  Envelop 4 contains a questionnaire. We will please ask that you 





PARTICIPANT ___        ROUND ______ 
 
0p 
10p 20p 30p 40p 50p 
60p 70p 80p 90p Ȼ1.0 
Ȼ1.10 Ȼ1.20 Ȼ1.30 Ȼ1.40 Ȼ1.50 
Ȼ1.60 Ȼ1.70 Ȼ1.80 Ȼ1.90 Ȼ2.0 






         PARTICIPANT ___        ROUND ______ 
 
0p 
 10p 20p 30p 40p 50p 
60p 70p 80p 90p Ȼ1.0 
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Ȼ1.10 Ȼ1.20 Ȼ1.30 Ȼ1.40 Ȼ1.50 
Ȼ1.60 Ȼ1.70 Ȼ1.80 Ȼ1.90 Ȼ2.0 











































Exit Survey (Workers) 
Participant No:      
 
Name of Respondent: 
 
 
1. How interesting did you find this workshop? 
Not Very         Very 
Interesting         Interesting 
  � 1.   � 2.      � 3.  � 4.   � 5. 
 
2. What do you think was the objective of the workshop? 
 
 
3. As a worker in the workshop, how fair do you think the inspectors were in the 
workshop?   
Very         Very 
fair                    Unfair 
� 1.   � 2.      � 3.  � 4.   � 5. 
 
4. How would you characterize your behavior in the workshop? 
Very         Very 
fair         Unfair 
� 1.   � 2.      � 3.  � 4.   � 5. 
 
Instructions: Use the scale below to indicate the extent to which you agree with each 
statement as it applies to you. 
 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Agree 
4 = Strongly Agree 
 
5.   I am more affected when someone criticizes me in public than when someone 
criticizes me in private. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
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1 2 3 4 
        
 
6.   During a discussion, I try not to ask questions because I may appear ignorant to 
others.  
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
7.  I maintain a low profile because I do not want to make mistakes in front of other 
people. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
8. Before I make comments in the presence of other people, I qualify my remarks. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
9. I downplay my abilities and achievements so that others do not have unrealistically 
high expectations of me. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
10.  I carefully plan what I am going to say or do to minimize mistakes. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
11.  I say I may be in error before commenting on something. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
12.  When I meet other people, I am concerned about their expectations of me. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
13.  I hesitate asking for help because I think my request will be an inconvenience to 
others. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 




14.  I try not to do things that call attention to myself.  
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
15.  I do not criticize others because this may embarrass them. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
16.  I carefully watch others' actions before I do anything. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
17.  I will not complain publicly even when I have been treated unfairly. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
18.  I try to act like others to be consistent with social norms. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
19.  Before I do anything in public, I prepare myself for any possible consequence. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
20.  I prefer to use a third party to help resolve our differences between another person 
and me. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
21.  When discussing a problem, I make an effort to let the person know that I am not 
blaming him or her.  
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
22.  When someone criticizes me, I try to avoid that person. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
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23.  When I make a mistake in front of others, I try to prevent them from noticing it. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
24.  Even when I know another person is at fault, I am careful not to criticize that person. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
25.  When someone embarrasses me, I try to forget it. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 
        
 
On a scale of 1 -5, please answer the following questions. When deciding what to do in the 
workshop how important was the following: 
26. Investment of others 
Very import.     Quite import.     Fairly import.    Slightly import.     Not at all import. 
                                                                                                                    
 
 
27.  Shame before the inspector 
Very import.     Quite import.     Fairly import.    Slightly import.     Not at all import.        
                                                                                                                    
 
28.  Potential sanction  
Very import.     Quite import.     Fairly import.    Slightly import.     Not at all import. 
                                                                                                                    
 
29.   Identity of the inspector 
Very import.     Quite import.     Fairly import.    Slightly import.     Not at all import. 
                                                                                                                                
 
30. I wanted to make as much money as I could for myself.  
Very import.     Quite import.     Fairly import.    Slightly import.     Not at all import.                         
                                                                                                                   
 
31. I wanted the group to make as much money as possible. 
Very import.     Quite import.     Fairly import.    Slightly import.     Not at all import.                       
                                                                                                                   
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34. I am going to tell you the names of some occupations. Which of these occupations are 
generally considered to require a high level of education? For each occupation, please indicate 
one of the following levels: highest, quite high, average, quite low, and lowest.  
  
  
   
(01) Trader   5                  4                3                  2                1                 
 
(02) Doctor   5                  4                3                  2                1                 
 
(03) Carpenter   5                  4                3                  2                1                 
 
(04) Farmer   5                  4                3                  2                1                 
 
(05) Mechanic   5                  4                3                  2                1                 
 
 
35. Now I am going to mention the names of some occupations. People often differentiate 
between high status occupations and low status occupations. If you were to rank these 
occupations on five levels from highest to lowest, how would you classify them? For each 




   
(01) Trader   5                  4                3                  2                1                 
 
(02) Doctor   5                  4                3                  2                1                 
 
(03) Carpenter   5                  4                3                  2                1                 
 
(04) Farmer   5                  4                3                  2                1                 
 
(05) Mechanic   5                  4                3                  2                1                 
 
 
36. Would you prefer to have a higher status occupation but not richa or to have a lower status 
occupation but richb.     




























General Information    
37. Were you born in this city?    � 1. No   � 2. Yes     
 
38. If no, please where were you born (Town/region)?           
 
39. How long have you lived in this city?   Years___   Months____ 
 
40. Does your community carry out community project like clean up, etc.?    
� 1. No   � 2. Yes     
 
41. In the last year, how many time did your community carried out a community project? 
_______ 
 
Out of those, in how many did you take part? _______  
42. Are you an active member of a local church or mosque and how active are you? 
No, not at all         Yes, very active 
� 1.   � 2.      � 3.  � 4.   � 5. 
 
43. How many hours a week do you spend on church/mosque activities? _______ 
 
44. What is your occupation?  
 
45. Do you think your occupation is considered high or low status in the society?  
 
� 1. High   � 2. Low        � 3. It depends   � 4. Not sure    
 
46. If you were starting life all over again, what occupation would you have dreamt to be in? 
(one response ONLY)    
 
 
Trust and Risk Taking Behaviors (Behavioral measures) 
 General trust questions 
47.   Do you think most people in general would try to take advantage of you if they got a 
chance, or would they try to be fair?" 
� 1. Would take advantage of you     
� 2. Would try to be fair  
� 3. Depends  
� 4. Don't know  
� 99. No Answer  
 
Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just 
looking out for themselves? 
� 1. Try to be helpful  
� 2. Just look out for themselves 
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� 3. Depends  
� 4. Don't know  
� 99. No Answer  
 
48. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too 
careful in dealing with people?" 
� 1. Most people can be trusted  
� 2. Can't be too careful 
� 3. Depends  
� 4. Don't know  
� 99. No Answer  
 
49. Rate your willingness to trust others on a scale of 1-6 where 1 is always trusting and 6 
      is never trusting. 
 
Always trusting                         never trusting 
 � 1.  � 2.  � 3.  � 4.  � 5.  � 6. 
 
 
50. How often do you leave your door unlocked? 
� 1. Very Often  
� 2. Often  
� 3. Sometimes  
� 4. Rarely  
� 5. Never  
 
51. How willing are you to take risks, in general? 
Very much willing        Not at all willing 
 





52. What is the highest level of education you have completed?    
      � 1. No education 
� 2. Primary school 
� 3. Some secondary school 
� 4. Completed high school 
� 5. Undergraduate university 
� 6. Postgraduate university 
 
53. What is your marital Status?    � 1. Married  
� 2. Single 
� 3. Divorced 
� 4. Widow 
� 5. Not together for any reason 




54.  Whom do you live with?    � 1. alone 
� 2. just partner 
� 3. just children 
� 4. partner and children 
� 5. extended  
� 6. Friends 
� 7. Other 
 
55. Gender of respondent:    � 1. Female                           
� 2. Male 
 


























3 Are the elder more effective implementing punishment? 
Experimental evidence from urban Ghana 
 
Edward Asiedu, Marcela Ibanez 
 
 
Abstract: To study the persistence of cultural norms that mandate respect towards the elder, 
we conducted an artefactual field experiment in two cities in Ghana.  Using a public good 
game with third-party punishment, we find that punisher's age is an important determinant of 
cooperation.  Our results indicate the elder are more efficient using punishment than 
youngsters.  
Keywords: Field experiment, status, age, punishment, public goods 













3.1 Introduction  
In some regions in the world, including Asia and Africa, there is a deep respect for the elder 
(Sung, 2001, Van der Geest, 1997; Löckenhoff et al., 2009).  The elder are regarded as 
repository of communal wisdom and hence are considered the teachers and directors of the 
young (Diamond, 2012). They are regarded aS natural authorities and their opinions are 
requested in important decisions as well as in every day matters (Karlberg, 2003).  However, 
as population migrate from rural to urban areas and as the younger get more educated the 
respect towards the elder seems to be decaying.  The objective of this paper is to investigate if 
elders are more respected than juniors and hence are more effective when acting as 
authorities.  We ask: if an authority is required to impose law and order who should it be?     
Our experimental design is based on a public good game with third party punishment. We 
vary exogenously the age of the third-party punisher and compare elder versus junior 
punishers. We also vary the technology available to punish and compare non-monetary and 
monetary sanctions. To investigate how the urbanization process affects respect towards the 
elder we conducted an artefactual field experiment in two urban cities in Ghana.  Ho, a 
relatively small city with about 100 thousand inhabitants, and Kumasi, the second biggest city 
in the country with a population of a little more than 2 million inhabitants.   
There has been large empirical evidence supporting the effect of exogenous sanctioning 
mechanisms in inducing cooperation or overcoming social dilemmas (e.g. Andreoni and Gee, 
2012; Baldassarri and Grossman, 2011; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004, Kube and Traxler, 2011; 
Yamagishi, 1986).  Nonetheless, one topic that has received little attention is how 
socioeconomic characteristics of the punisher affect the effectiveness of sanctions.  We 
contribute to this research considering how the age of the punisher affects cooperation.  
Previous evidence supports that age matters for social preferences (Cardenas and Carpenter, 
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2009). It has also been shown that age affects individuals willingness to use punishment (Egas 
and Riedl; 2008 and Gächter and Herrmann, 2009). Unlike previous work we focus on third 
party punishment.  Moreover, we trace the origins of this difference and consider how the 
urbanization process changes traditional cultural values that subscribe respect towards the 
elder. 
 
3.2 Experimental design and procedures 
Our experimental design is based on a repeated public good game with third-party 
punishment (see Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).  Upon arrival to the experiment, participants 
are assigned the roles of contributors or third party punishers.  The oldest and youngest 
participants in a given session are assigned the role of third party punishers.  The other 
participants are assigned the role of contributors.  Yet, in order to avoid priming participants 
on age, we select punishers only based on visual inspection only so we do not ask age or 
make any reference towards age as selection criteria.    To signal that the punishers are not 
exactly the same, punishers who look older sat in the first row, while punishers who look 
younger sat in the second row. 
Participants assigned the role of contributors are assigned simultaneously to two random 
and anonymous groups. Each group consists of three contributors and one punisher.  Subjects 
do not know the exact identities of the other members of their group. Yet, they know that 
contributions to Group 1 will be observed by one of the three punishers sitting in the first row 
(older punishers) while contributions to Group 2 will be observed by one of the three 
punishers sitting in the second row (younger punishers).   
Contributor, i, receives an endowment of 250 pesewas (2.5 Ghana cedis) for each of the 
two groups he belongs to, j, and has to decide how to distribute the endowment between a 
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public (𝑐𝑖𝑖) and a private account in each of the two groups. Each pesewa invested in the 
public account yields a payoff of b=2/3 pesewas to each group member while each pesewa 
not contributed are deposited in the subject’s private account where it yields a return of one to 
the contributor.    
The third party punisher receives 500 pesewas. His task is to observe contribution levels 
for the three contributors in one group and decide whether or not to show disapproval sending 
sanctioning points, S. Under the non-monetary or social sanctioning treatment, the punisher 
can send a sad face to disapprove group members’ contributions.  Social sanctions are costless 
for both sender and recipient (v=p=0).  In the monetary punishment treatment, the punisher 
spends 8.33 pesewas to reduce the monetary payments of recipients by 25 pesewas (1:3). 
Punishers can send a maximum of only one punishment point. The punisher neither 
contributes to the public good, nor receives any payment from contributions in the public 
account.    The payoff for contributors is:  
𝜋𝑖 = ∑ �250 − 𝑐𝑖𝑖 +
2
3
∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑖3𝑖=1 − 𝑣𝑆𝑖𝑖 �2𝑖=1                                      (1) 
where S ∈ {0,1} indicates whether player i was sanctioned or not. The pay-off for punishers 
is: 
𝜋𝑖 = 500 − ∑ 𝐶𝑖 𝑛=3𝑖=1 𝑆𝑖        (2) 
Since monetary sanctioning is costly for the monitor, his optimal response is not to 
sanction.  Since 0 < 𝑏 < 1 < 𝑐𝑏, the optimal investment into the public good in each group is 
zero (∂πi ∂cij � =  −1 + b < 0). However, the social optimal is to contributing all 
endowments into the group account ( ∂πi ∂cij  � =  −1 + nb > 0). 
This game is repeated over 10 rounds. Subjects received feedback between rounds on the 
contributions of other group members, sanctioning decisions from the punisher and their 
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payoffs. One round is randomly selected to determine the actual payoffs. The experimental 
design is presented in Table 3.1.   
Table 3.1 Experimental Design 
  
 Within Subject Treatment 
Type of Monitor 
Between Subject 
Treatment 
Group 1 Group 2 
Social Sanction Old Young 
Monetary Sanction Old Young 
 
 
We implemented the experiment in urban areas where there is high degree of anonymity 
across participants.  We conducted the experiments in two cities that had different degrees of 
urbanization measured by population size:  The small city of Ho with 100 thousand 
inhabitants and the medium sized city of Kumasi with over 2 million inhabitants.  The 
recruitment process was done with collaboration from Assemblymen and women.  The 
experimental sessions were conducted in the local school or the community center with 
participants from different neighborhoods. On an average a session lasted approximately three 
hours with an average earning of 700 pesewas (3 EUR) compared with a minimum daily 






3.3 Empirical results 
In total 120 subjects participated in 7 experimental sessions.  As each participant took more 
than one decision, we can account for unobserved correlation across decisions using random 
effects models.  Table 3.2 presents the estimated coefficients for sanctioning behavior and 
cooperation in each city separately.  The first model is a linear probability model in which the 
dependent variable takes value equal to one for sanctioning and zero otherwise.  The second 
model considers a random effects Tobit model to account for the left and right-censoring of 
the contribution levels. 
 As expected, we find that the likelihood to sanction decreases with contribution levels.  
Whereas in the small city of Ho, older and younger punishers are equally likely to use 
sanctioning (both social and monetary), in the larger city of Kumasi, the elder are less likely 
to use sanctions than the junior punisher.  This behavior could indicate that in larger cities, the 
young are more severe judges as a strategy to compensate for their lower status.    
In Kumasi the elder are less likely to impose sanctions than the junior punishers, hence one 
would expect that cooperation would also be lower in groups with elder punishers compared 
with junior ones.  However, our results indicate that there are no significant differences in 
contributions between groups with elder and junior punishers under the non-monetary and 
monetary sanctioning treatments. This result indicates that the severity of sanctioning by the 
junior punishers in Kumasi does not translate into higher contribution levels.  The respect to 
the elderly compensate for their lower use of punishment compared with junior punishers.  
More evidence in support of higher respect towards the elder is found in Ho.  Even though the 
elder and the junior punishers sanction as much, cooperation is significantly higher towards 
elder punishers in the monetary sanctions treatment. 
   
84 
 
Table 3.2 Sanctioning and cooperation by treatment 
 
Random Effects GLS Random Effects Tobit 
 
Sanctions Contributions 
  Ho Kumasi Ho Kumasi    
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Contribution -0.0526** -0.106*** 
 




                
Senior Punisher -0.107 -0.367** -0.0788 -0.0692 
 
(0.115) (0.145) (0.061) (0.047) 
Monetary Sanction 0.0299 -0.111 -0.199 0.288**  
 
(0.108) (0.143) (0.159) (0.129) 
Senior X Monetary -0.0436 0.176 0.159* 0.0402 
 
(0.151) (0.195) (0.087) (0.067) 
Period -0.0255*** -0.0479*** 0.0300*** 0.0330*** 
 








-0.0628 -0.0885*   
   
(0.090) (0.054) 
Constant 0.642*** 1.371*** 1.822*** 1.314*** 
  (0.155) (0.162) (0.159) (0.115) 
Observations 216 204 648 648 
Standard Errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, 
** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
3.4 Concluding discussion  
Our results indicate that cultural norms that dictate respect for the elder persist in urban areas 
in Ghana.  Older third-party monitors tend to induce higher levels of cooperation. While the 
elder is less or equally likely to impose sanctions than junior third party punishers, 
cooperation is equal or higher in groups with an elder third party punisher.  This result 
indicates that the age of the judge is an important determinant of cooperative behavior.  To 
induce cooperation in the field, policy makers must understand the social norm that permeates 
the society in question.   
Acknowledgements: We thank the German Research Foundation (DFG) for financial support 








Hello and welcome to the workshop. Thank you all very much for making time to come to 
this workshop. We really do appreciate. In this workshop you will have the option to earn 
some money. How much money you earn will depend on your decision and the decision of 
others in the group.  Money earned in the workshop will be paid to you in cash at the end of 
the workshop.  During this workshop you will be asked to perform a task.  We will explain to 
you the task at its due time.  In total the workshop will last about 2 hours.   
Before we start the different tasks, we please ask that you all come to the front of the room so 
we can reorganize the seats.   
Please do not open the envelops on the table. 
In order to maintain comparability across different participants in the workshop we have 
prepared some instructions that we will read to you.  
For the task, you will have different roles in the workshop. Some of you will be called 
‘workers’ and others will be called ‘inspectors’.   
What do workers need to do? 
For the next task, you will have different roles in the workshop. Some of you will be called 
‘workers’ and others will be called ‘inspectors’.   
86 
 
Each worker will be assigned to two independent groups ‘Group Pink’ and ‘Group Blue’. 
Each group consists of three participants; you and two others participants. You will not know 
who is in each of the groups you belong.  
Each worker will receive Ȼ2.5  for each group they belong. So in total you will receive Ȼ5. In 
each group there is a group account. Your task is to decide how much you want to invest in 
the  group account and how much to put in your pocket. Whatever money you put in your 
pocket will multiply by one. The money that you invest in the group account will be 
multiplied by two and will be equally shared by the three group members.  Similarly, the 
money that other group members invest in the group account will be multiply by two and will 
be equally shared among the three group members.  
You have to make this decision for your ‘Pink Group’and  as well as for your ‘Blue Group’.  
You will receive two decision cards like these ones (show example).  The pink card refers to  
group Pink, while the light blue card refers to the group Blue.  The cards have boxes with the 
numbers, ranging from 10 pesewa to Ȼ 2.5.Your task is to ‘circle’ the amount of money that 
you want to invest into the group account.  For instance if you want to invest all your Ȼ 2.5, 
then you need to circle Ȼ 2.5. If you want to invest only 10 pesewas , then you circle 10p. The 
money that is not invested in the group account will be automatically transferred to your 
private pocket. Let’s demonstrate with the following example (use posters):: 
Example1: 
Assume that you invested 60pesewas into the Group Pink and kept Ȼ 1.90 in your pocket.  
Hence in the decision card for Group Pink, pink, you ‘circle’ 60p.  For ‘Group Blue’, let’s 
assume that you invested 80pesewas into the group account and kept Ȼ 1.70 in your pocket.  
Now in the decision card for group blue, light blue card, you ‘circle’ 80p. How much do you 
receive?  Well, what you earn will depend on how much money you and the other two 
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subjects in each group invested in the group account and how much money each person kept 
in their own pockets. If the others did exactly the same as you, and invested  60p each to 
Group Pink’s account and 80p to Group Blue’s account, the total investment in the Group 
Pink’s account  will be: 60p*3=Ȼ1.8 and in Group Blue is 80p*3= Ȼ 2.4.  Your earning from 
Group Pink would be Ȼ 1.90 + Ȼ 1.8*2/3 = Ȼ 3.10. And how much would you earn from 
Group Blue?  Ȼ 1.70+ Ȼ 2.4*2/3 = Ȼ 3.30.  
Example2: 
Assume that for ‘Group Pink’ you invested 0pesewa into the group account and kept all  
Ȼ2.50 in your pocket.  Hence in the decision card for Group Pink, pink, you ‘circle’ 0p.  If the 
other two participants in Group Pink invested on average Ȼ2.0  into the Group Pink Account,   
then the total amount of money in Group Pink account is 0p+ Ȼ 2*2= Ȼ 4.  And your earnings 
from Group Pink is Ȼ 2.5 + 4*2/3 =  Ȼ 5.17. 
For ‘Group Blue’, let’s assume that you invested Ȼ 2.5 into the group account in ‘Group Blue’ 
and kept nothing in your pocket.  Now in the decision card for group blue, light blue card, you 
‘circle’ Ȼ2.5. If the other participants in Group Blue invested on an  average invested 0p each 
into the group account, the total amount of money in the group account would be Ȼ2.5+0p*2= 
Ȼ2.5. How much would your earnings be?  0p + 2.5* 2/3 = Ȼ 1.67 
After making your decision as a worker on the Decision Cards, the assistant will pass by to 
collect the decision cards and send them to the inspectors.   
What do inspectors need to do? 
The job of the inspectors is to observe workers group investment and to fill a report. For 
carrying out this task the inspectors will receive Ȼ5.0. After observing each worker’s 
investment to the group account, the inspector has the opportunity to show dissatisfaction or 
disapproval of any worker’s investment level to the group account. If the inspector is 
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dissatisfied, the inspector can send one sadface to one worker.  Each inspector will observe 
decisions for ONLY one group.   
 
After the inspectors have made their decision workers will receive two REPORTS. One from 
the inspector for group pink and one from the inspector for group blue. The REPORT is at the 
back of the DECISION CARDS. The inspectors will also put the sadface if any, in the middle 
of the report card and fold it (Demonstrate) to be sent to the workers. The report card looks 
like this one (show with example on poster). In the report workers will see how much money 
in total is investment in the group account and how much money each person receives back 
from the group account.  
Let’s consider our last example.  Two of the ‘workers’ invested 0p in the group account and 
the other invested all Ȼ 2.5 into the group account. Hence the inspector needs to write: 
 
Total investment in the group account: Ȼ2.5.  
 
We double the total investment in the group account, so the group account now has Ȼ5.  This 
value is divided equally among all the three participants in the group. In this case, everyone 




















The inspectors also have to complete an ‘Inspector History Form’. The inspectors have to 
complete the ‘Inspector History Form’ first which looks like this one (show example and 
explain on poster) before completing the report cards for each of the three participants. 
 
Let’s demonstrate how the ‘Inspector History Form’ should be completed by the inspectors:   
Let’s consider our last example.  Let’s assume ‘worker1’ and ‘worker 2’ are those who 
invested 0p in the group account and ‘worker 3 invested all Ȼ 2.5 into the group account. 
Let’s assume the inspector sent a sadface picture to ´worker 2’. Hence the inspector needs to 




 1 2 3 Total Investment 
Investment group 
account 0 0 Ȼ 2.5 Ȼ2.5 
Sad Face  1   
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Total investment in the group account: Ȼ2.5. When the inspectors’ finishes completing the 
‘Inspector History Form’ and the report cards, our assistants will come round and collect 
them.  
 
This process will be repeated a total of 10 rounds. At the end of the 10 rounds, one round will 
be selected at random for payment in cash. The money you receive will be yours to take home 
and use as you please.  
 
<CONTROL QUESTIONS> 
Before starting the third task, we would like to verify that we had been clear in explaining the 
task.   
Please open envelope 1 and solve the questions.   
Imagine that you are a worker and want to invest Ȼ1.2 in the group account.  1. Please 






10p 20p 30p 40p 50p 
 
60p 70p 80p 90p Ȼ1.0 
 




Ȼ1.60 Ȼ1.70 Ȼ1.80 Ȼ1.90 Ȼ2.0 
 
Ȼ2.10 Ȼ2.20 Ȼ2.30 Ȼ2.40 Ȼ2.50 
 
 
Assume the other two group members together contributed 60p each into the group account. 
5. How much money is left in your pocket after investing?  
6. How much money (payback) will you receive from the group account? 
7. How much money will you receive in total? 
8. How much money will you receive if the inspector sends you a sadface? 
Please open envelope 2 and solve the second question.   
Imagine that you are an inspector for a group and observed that two people invested Ȼ1.50 
each in the group account and the other invested 0p in the group account. Please represent this 
case using the following REPORT CARD. 
       REPORT CARD 














 <Random selection into roles> 
Now we will continue by separating some of you to be ‘workers’ and others to be 
‘inspectors’. As I told you before, some of you will serve as inspectors. These people will 
92 
 
serve as inspectors. The others will be ‘workers'.  I would like to ask participants with the 
following numbers at the back of their big white envelope to come to the front (mention the 
numbers of the 6 selected inspectors). Please bring all your belongings along.  We would like 
to ask the participants standing in front with the following numbers (mention the numbers of 
the 3 older inspectors) to sit on the front row and those with the following numbers (mention 
the numbers of the 3 younger inspectors) to sit on the chairs on the second row.  
 
Actual Task 
Now we will start the third task. Please, participants who are sitting behind from third row 
‘workers’ should open envelop 3 and take out decision card pink and light blue for round 1. 
The pink card will be observed by one of the participants sitting in the first row and the blue 
by one of the participants sitting in the second row. Please when finish making your 
decisions; turn the decisions sheets upside down on the table so our assistants can collect 
them. Please begin by making your first investment decisions into group pink and group blue.  
 
Exit Questionnaire 
Please open envelop 4.  Envelop 4 contains a questionnaire. We will please ask that you 










PARTICIPANT ___        ROUND ______ 
 
0p 
10p 20p 30p 40p 50p 
60p 70p 80p 90p Ȼ1.0 
Ȼ1.10 Ȼ1.20 Ȼ1.30 Ȼ1.40 Ȼ1.50 
Ȼ1.60 Ȼ1.70 Ȼ1.80 Ȼ1.90 Ȼ2.0 






         PARTICIPANT ___        ROUND ______ 
 
0p 
 10p 20p 30p 40p 50p 
60p 70p 80p 90p Ȼ1.0 
Ȼ1.10 Ȼ1.20 Ȼ1.30 Ȼ1.40 Ȼ1.50 
Ȼ1.60 Ȼ1.70 Ȼ1.80 Ȼ1.90 Ȼ2.0 
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